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ABSTRACT
Equitable efficiency in multiple criteria optimization was introduced math-
ematically in the middle of nineteen-nineties. The concept tends to strengthen
the notion of Pareto efficiency by imposing additional conditions on the preference
structure defining the Pareto preference. It is especially designed to solve multiple
criteria problems having commensurate criteria where different criteria values can
be compared directly.
In this dissertation we study some theoretical and practical aspects of equi-
tably efficient solutions. The literature on equitable efficiency is not very extensive
and provides very limited number of ways of generating such solutions. After in-
troducing some relevant notations, we develop some scalarization based methods of
generating equitably efficient solutions. The scalarizations developed do not assume
any special structure of the problem. We prove an existence result for linear multiple
criteria problems.
Next, we show how equitably efficient solutions arise in the context of a
particular type of linear complementarity problem and matrix games. The set of
equitably efficient solutions, in general, is a subset of efficient solutions. The multiple
criteria alternative of the linear complementarity problem dealt in our dissertation
has identical efficient and equitably efficient solution sets.
Finally, we demonstrate the relevance of equitable efficiency by applying it
to the problem of regression analysis and asset allocation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Multiple Criteria Optimization and Equitable Efficiency
Decision making is an integral and indispensable part of human life. Every
day one has to make decisions of some type or the other. The decision process is
relatively easier when there is a single criterion or objective in mind. The process
gets complicated when one has to make decisions in the presence of more than one
criteria to judge the decisions. In such circumstances, a single decision might not
exist which optimizes all the criteria simultaneously.
Multi-criteria optimization is a mathematical modeling approach to decision
making. It deals with optimization problems governing the optimization of more
than one criterion with or without constraints on the decision variables. Contrary
to intuition, results of single-criteria optimization do not naturally extend to the
realm of multi-criteria optimization.
Roots of multi-criteria optimization can be associated with the seminal work
of Pareto (1909), who theorized that society was in the ‘best state’ when no one’s
state of life could be improved without deteriorating someone else’s state of life.
In traditional multi-criteria optimization, the criteria are considered incom-
parable. Different criteria might represent different physical outcomes and/or en-
tities having different units of measurement. Available methods then tend to find
solutions to the problem without delving into the practical interpretations of the so-
lutions obtained. In practice, there are cases where the criteria to be optimized can
be compared directly in the sense that they represent the same entity and all of them
have the same units of measurement. In such a case, interest lies not only in finding
optimal solutions to all the criteria but do this in an equitable way, in a way where
all the criteria are treated ‘impartially’, so as to improve all the criteria as much
as possible. Impartial treatment of criteria brings the issue of ‘equity’ among solu-
tions to the fore. In equitable multi-criteria optimization(Kostreva and Ogryczak,
1997), the focus is on the distribution among the solutions rather to the solutions
themselves.
A problem most frequently encountered in classical multi-criteria optimiza-
tion is that the set of solutions considered by the optimization process is an infinite
set, making the selection of a unique preferred decision quite difficult. Consider-
ing models with equitable efficiency relieves some of the burden from the decision
maker by shrinking the solution set. It turns out that the set of equitably efficient
solutions is contained within the set of efficient solution for the same problem. It
is noteworthy that the concept of equitable efficiency does not contradict or de-
value the notion of Pareto efficiency; in fact, it strengthens the latter by imposing
additional constraints on the principles governing efficiency.
As noted earlier, multi-criteria optimization is concerned with the optimiza-
tion of more than one objective function simultaneously. Any optimization model
becomes operational only when it clearly defines what optimization means. The
concept of optimality is easily comprehensible for single-criteria optimization prob-
lems. In such problems, two solutions can be easily compared on the basis of their
numerical or scalar values. In the multi-criteria case, a unique solution optimizing
all the criteria seldom exists and it becomes impossible to improve upon the value
of one criterion without worsening the value of at least one other criteria. As for
single-criteria optimization problems, solutions are judged according to their criteria
values and this defines a preference structure in the criteria space. Solution concepts
are developed from an axiomatic point of view and defined in terms of the corre-
sponding preference model Vincke (1992). The preference model corresponding to
standard Pareto efficiency assumes a preference relation defined on the criteria space
to satisfy the properties of reflexivity, strict monotonicity and transitivity. Addi-
tionally, if it also satisfies the principles of symmetry or anonymity and inequality
reduction or the principle of transfers, it becomes an equitable preference relation.
Solutions obtained on the assumptions of an equitable preference relation are said
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to be equitably efficient. It is clear that an equitable preference relation is a also
Pareto preference and hence equitably efficient solutions are Pareto efficient too.
The notion of equitable efficiency in multi-criteria optimization came up in
the late 90’s,(Kostreva and Ogryczak, 1997). The concept is especially tailored and
designed for problems having uniform criteria, for example the case where different
criteria might represent allocation of resources or location of facilities at specific
point. In such cases, it is desirable to come up with an equitable distribution of
resources to serve the public equitably.
1.2 Research Motivation and Goal
In multi-criteria optimization, the primary goal is to obtain a subset of
the efficient designs. Generally all the existing methods intend to find efficient
solutions in two stages. In the first stage, all the criteria are aggregated into a single
criterion by some aggregation function and in the second stage, techniques of solving
single-criteria problem are applied to the aggregated problem. In aggregating these
different and conflicting criteria, one does not pay much attention to their nature.
The criteria are aggregated even if they are incomparable. This process usually
involves scaling, rendering the criteria unit less.
Motivation for the current research stems from the need to treat a particular
class of multi-criteria optimization problems, namely, one in which all the criteria
to be optimized are uniform, differently than what has been done in the literature.
The objectives of this research are to study the theory and methodology of equitable
efficiency in multi-criteria optimization, devise new methods to generate equitably
efficient solutions, stress the importance of equitably efficient solutions by identifying
solutions of certain problems as equitably efficient solutions of related problems and
demonstrate the relevance of equitable efficiency by looking at practical applications
in some areas. Chapter 2, which is a literature survey on equitable efficiency in
multi-criteria optimization, gives an overview of related research done in this area
by various authors. The remaining text is organized as follows.
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Chapter 3 presents the formulation of multi-criteria optimization problems in
general. Notations and terminology required in subsequent chapters are introduced.
Equitable efficiency is defined, both from an axiomatic as well as a vector point
of view. The relation between equitable efficiency of a multi-criteria optimization
problem and Pareto efficiency of an associated problem is presented.
Chapter 4 presents some of the existing results related to the generation
of equitably efficient solutions. Scalarization techniques, often used to compute
efficient solutions for a multi-criteria optimization problem, with additional restric-
tions on the parameters, can be applied to generate equitably efficient solutions.
We develop some equitable-scalarization-based methods of finding equitably efficient
solutions. Methods for finding equitably efficient solutions of a multi-criteria opti-
mization problem depend on ordering of objective functions in a monotonic order.
Ordering of functions makes their implementation hard. We develop some equitable-
scalarization-based methods to generate equitably efficient solutions. These methods
act on the objective functions directly without taking any ordering into account.
Furthermore, we present the two-phase minimax method of equitable efficiency.
All the methods developed in this chapter make no assumption about the specific
structure of the optimization problem. We apply the Benson’s criteria to prove
nonexistence of equitably efficient solutions for a particular class of problems.
Chapter 5 stresses the relevance of equitable efficiency by noticing how eq-
uitably efficient solutions naturally arise as solutions of certain problems. We prove
that the solution of a matrix game can be characterized as an equitably efficient
solution of a related multi-criteria problem.
Linear complementarity problems have been a subject of active research for
more than 40 years. In(Kostreva and Wiecek, 1993; Kostreva and Yang, 2004),
the authors propose a unifying approach toward the seemingly different topics of
multi-criteria optimization and a linear complementary problems.We prove that
if all the components of a nondominated vector are equal, then the solution is
equitably nondominated and use the result to relate the solutions of a given linear
complementarity problem to the equitably efficient solutions of a particular type of
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multi-criteria optimization problem. Existence/non-existence of solutions of linear
complementarity problems are proved in terms of equitably efficient solutions of a
related multi-criteria optimization problem.
Chapters 6 and 7 present the applicability of equitable efficiency to problems
where it is desirable to treat all the criteria uniformly or impartially. For such prob-
lems, looking for solutions with smaller differences between the component criteria
than those obtained from Pareto efficiency is desirable. In the literature on equitable
efficiency, the notion is applied to problems of location and portfolio analysis. In
chapter 6, we present the regression problem of parameter estimation as a multi-
criteria optimization problem where the residuals are considered as criteria functions
to be minimized. Classical methods of regression analysis are suitable under certain
assumptions of the statistical distribution of the given data. Equitable efficiency is
applied without any assumptions on the data set. Equitably efficient solutions for
the multi-criteria regression problem are obtained. We also show how the solution
of the ordinary least squares problem can be obtained as a limiting solution of our
multi-criteria problem.
In multi-criteria portfolio analysis, most of the available models, find effi-
cient portfolios for a bi-criteria problem, treating the expected return and variance
of the stocks as the two criteria. It is noteworthy that these two criteria are in-
commensurate in terms of the units involved in expressing the two criteria values.
Treating the two criteria separately seems more plausible in such a scenario.
In Chapter 7, we build a multi-class asset allocation problem where all stocks
within a particular class are assumed to have some common features. Grouping
the expected return from different classes gives rise to a uniform multi-criteria asset
allocation problem where each class is treated uniformly. We maximize the expected
return of each asset class subject to bounds on the covariance of the assets. A
two-phase method of finding equitably efficient allocations is described. Solutions
obtained are analyzed with respect to solutions obtained without considering equity
of efficient solutions.
5
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation with some suggestions for further re-
search.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Multi-criteria optimization problems, in general, are concerned with finding
Pareto efficient or non-dominated solutions. Such solutions have the property that
one can not improve the value of a criterion without deteriorating the value of at
least one other criterion. Such problems have been studied extensively since the
publication of the seminal work of Pareto (1909) and detailed references on some of
the methods related to various multi-criteria optimization processes can be found
in Evans (1984) and more recently in Miettinen (1999).
Multi-criteria optimization forms a part of the more general theory of multi-
criteria decision making discussed by Zeleny (1982), Chankong and Haimes (1983)
and Yu (1985). The last step toward a decision making process is to provide the
decision maker with some efficient solutions of the related multi-criteria problem.
There may be instances of certain problems where the decision maker is not content
with mere efficiency of solutions but requires some kind of parity among the various
criteria values. It is in such a context that the notion of equitably efficient solution
gains importance.
Equity has been a topic of intense interest for sociologists and economists.
Some prevalent measures of inequality can be found in Atknison (1970) and Allison
(1978). Fandel and Gal (2001) and Luss (1999) emphasize the issue of equity within
different areas of applications.
Increasing interest in equity issues resulted in new methodologies in the areas
of operations research. Luss (1999) reviews a variety of resource allocation problems
where it is desirable to allocate limited resources equitably among several activities.
He discusses the lexicographic minimax approach to find equitable solutions for such
problems.
In a recent article, Lemaitre et al. (2003) discuss the exploitation of earth
observing satellites by different groups of users from the multi-criteria optimiza-
tion perspective. The authors attempt to find equitable and efficient allocation of
resources resulting from the co-exploitation of a satellite by several agents. Four dif-
ferent approaches for selecting the best allocation are proposed. The first approach,
allocating satellite revolutions to each agent in turn, is perfectly equitable but lacks
efficiency. The second approach leans towards equity of allocation where the indi-
vidual utilities of the agents are combined linearly into a collective utility function,
but the weighting coefficients are chosen in a way so as to favor equity. In their
third approach, the authors adopt a bi-criteria approach, allowing comparison of
allocations over two criteria, equity and efficiency, with equity, in turn, being based
on inequality indices. The fourth approach considers a unique collective utility of
the agents to characterize equitable and efficient allocations. It is further argued
that each of the four approaches has its own way of tackling the equity/efficiency
dilemma.
It well known that any multi-criteria optimization problem starts usually
with an assumption that the criteria are incomparable, i.e., different criteria may
have different units and physical interpretations. Many applications, however, arise
from situations where the criteria are comparable; every criterion has the same
physical interpretation and their values can be compared directly. In such situations,
one is interested in solutions that are not only efficient but equitable as far as the
distribution of criteria values is concerned.
The literature available on equitable solutions related to operations research
is rather scarce and is mostly related to location and portfolio analysis problems.
The minimax approach is one of the common approaches to solving a multi-
criteria problem. Ogryczak (1997) argues that such an approach, applied to locating
public facilities, does not comply with the principles of efficiency and equity model-
ing. In this article he focuses on the lexicographic minimax method, a refinement of
the minimax method to solve such problems. He shows that this method complies
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with the Pareto efficiency principle and the principle of transfers, ideas essential for
equity; while the minimax approach may violate both these principles.
Kostreva and Ogryczak (1999) model location problems in a geographic in-
formation systems environment where the geographical space itself acts as the de-
cision as well as the criteria space. A multi-criteria problem is formed where an
individual objective function is associated with each spatial unit. Most classical
location studies focus on some aspects of two major approaches; the center or the
median approach. These two concepts minimize the maximum distance and the
average distance respectively. Under certain conditions these two methods generate
efficient solutions, but the solution concepts do not comply with the principle of
transfers, and hence, the solutions are not equitably efficient. Lexicographic median
and lexicographic center approaches are used to obtain equitably efficient solutions
of the multi-criteria location problem.
Kostreva and Ogryczak (1997) propose a new solution concept, called equi-
table efficiency, to solve linear optimization problems with multiple equitable crite-
ria. The criteria are equitable in the sense that they measure the same physical or
abstract entity. They have shown equitable efficiency to be a refinement of Pareto
efficiency by adding, to the reflexivity, strict monotonicity and transitivity of the
Pareto preference order, the requirements of impartiality and satisfaction of the prin-
ciple of transfers. Finding equitably efficient solutions of such problems is shown
to be equivalent to finding the Pareto efficient solutions of an associated problem
obtained by applying equitable aggregations to the original problem. Based on this
equivalence, several techniques are developed to approximate the equitably efficient
set. By means of an example, the authors explore the domination structure for
equitable efficiency in two-dimensions. It has been geometrically shown that the
domination structure for equitable efficiency is larger than that of Pareto efficiency.
This in turn implies that the set of equitably efficient solutions is smaller than the
set of efficient solutions, and, in fact, the equitably efficient set is contained within
the efficient set. The article stresses the fact that unlike Pareto domination, where
the domination structure is a convex cone, the domination structure for equitable
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efficiency is neither a cone nor convex. It is proved that if a linear multi-criteria
optimization problem has an efficient solution, then it has an equitably efficient
solution too. The equitably efficient set is proved to be connected.
Kostreva et al. (2004) present the theory of equitable efficiency in greater
generality. They discuss two different approaches for obtaining the equitably efficient
set for a general, possibly nonlinear multi-criteria optimization problem. In the first
approach they transform the problem to a single criterion optimization problem
by aggregating the functions using equitable aggregations. Any mapping from the
criteria space to the set of reals is said to form an equitable aggregation if it is
strictly monotonic in each criterion value, is indifferent or symmetric with respect
to the criterion values and satisfies the principle of transfers. They show that any
optimal solution to the single-criteria aggregated problem is equitably efficient for
the original multi-criteria problem. The second approach is based on the concept of
Ordered Weighted Averaging of criteria; a concept developed by Yager (1988). In
this approach, the criteria are arranged in a non-increasing order, thereby justifying
the name ordered; a cumulative ordering map is then applied to this ordered set of
criteria vectors. The cumulative ordering map is a function from the criteria space
to the criteria space. The components of the vector obtained after applying this map
represent the sum of the largest criterion value, the sum of the largest two criteria
values and so forth. Finally, another multi-criteria problem is formed whose criteria
are the coordinates of the cumulatively ordered criteria values. It is shown that an
efficient solution for this problem is equitably efficient for the original problem. The
authors apply two methods, namely the weighting and the lexicographic minimax
methods to the transformed problem to find equitably efficient solutions for the
original problem. Applying weights to the cumulatively ordered criteria results in the
single criterion problem referred to as the ordered weighted averaging aggregation
(OWA) problem. Further, it is proved that for strictly decreasing and positive
weights, every optimal solution of the OWA problem is an equitably efficient of the
original multi-criteria optimization problem. A limiting case of the OWA is one
where the difference among the weights tend to infinity. In this case, the OWA
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problem reduces to the lexicographic minimax problem, where one must minimize
the largest criteria, the second largest criteria, and so on, of the ordered criteria
vector. It is shown that any efficient solution of the lexicographic minimax problem
is equitably efficient for the original multi-criteria problem. The authors apply their
results to a case studied by Fandel and Gal (2001) and show that the solutions
obtained are more equitable than those obtained by Fandel and Gal (2001).
Though seemingly simple and theoretically well developed, the Ordered
Weighted Averaging approach of generating equitably efficient solutions is not sim-
ple to implement in practice. The first step in this approach is to order criteria
vectors, a collection of functions, and there is no easy way to do so. The ordering
map sorts the criteria vector in a non-decreasing order. Such an ordering tends to
introduce nonlinearity into the problem. An otherwise linear multi-criteria problem,
due to the effect of the ordering, may become piecewise linear, thereby bringing the
issue of non-differentiability to the fore.
Baatar and Wiecek (2006) use matrix approach to develop a preference
structure related to equitable efficiency. The authors present a two-step method
of generating equitably efficient solutions.
Ogryczak (2000) considers location problems as a multi-criteria optimization
problem, where for each client, there is defined an individual criterion function,
which measures the effect of a location pattern with respect to client satisfaction.
The author suggests a bi-criteria mean-equity approach as a simplified alternative
to the OWA approach of obtaining equitably efficient solutions. In this model,
efficiency of solutions is related to the minimization of mean criteria, a linear function
of the criteria, and equity is associated with the minimization of some inequity
measure, which again, is a function of the criteria. The author discusses the mean
equity model by assuming a trade-off coefficient between the inequity measure and
the mean criteria value. The trade-off coefficient is used to convert the bi-criteria
mean-equity model to a single criterion problem. An optimal solution to the single
criterion model is called a λ-mean-equity solution, λ being the trade-off coefficient.
The author presents results relating the λ-mean-equity solution to the equitably
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efficient solution of the original multi-criteria optimization problem. It is shown that
any λ-mean-equity solution, with λ within a certain range, is equitably efficient for
the original problem.
Portfolio analysis is another area of application of equitable efficiency. Eq-
uitable efficiency is suitable for finding solutions to multi-criteria problems with
uniform criteria. Ogryczak (2000) develops a multi-period multi-criteria linear pro-
gramming model of the classical portfolio problem with a finite set of securities.
For each security, the expected return for each period is available from observed or
forecasted data. Each period is associated with a criterion measuring the return
from investments into different securities. The model is not governed by the usual
Pareto preference commonly used to compare criteria vectors and identify efficient
solutions. Uniformity of the criteria is utilized to develop a new preference, the
equitable preference, which strengthens the properties of Pareto preference with
the property of impartiality and the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. The solu-
tions obtained are equitably efficient. Based on the theory of choice under risk, the
multi-criteria model with equitable preference is shown to be equivalent to a multi-
criteria program with modified criteria functions and the usual Pareto preference.
Since classical scalarization techniques for multi-criteria programs may generate so-
lutions that are not equitably efficient, the author presents two different approaches
of obtaining equitably efficient solutions. The first approach, based on a bi-criteria
problem, is analyzed in the context of three different measures of risk. In each case
it is shown that the optimal solution of a parameterized single criterion problem is
an equitably efficient solution of the portfolio selection problem. The second ap-
proach is based on the method of ordered weighted averaging (OWA). In the OWA
approach, weights are applied to the criteria vectors after arranging them in a non-
decreasing order. Varying the weights allows the identification of equitably efficient
solutions of the portfolio selection problem. When differences between weights tend
to infinity, the OWA problem yields the lexicographic maximization problem, whose
optimal solution is equitably efficient for the portfolio selection problem. For strictly
decreasing and positive weights, OWA yields linear programs with a large number
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of constraints. Duals of these linear programming problems can be efficiently solved
using the column generation technique. Optimal solutions to these problems are
shown to be equitably efficient for the portfolio selection problem.
13
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CHAPTER 3
NOTATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY
This chapter provides an introduction to the basic terminology used in multi-
criteria optimization. Results from literature, relevant to our work are presented.
3.1 Notations
The following notations are followed throughout the text.
Distinct vectors are denoted by superscripts while vector components are denoted
by subscripts. Rn denotes the n-dimensional Euclidean space.
Let y1, y2 be two vectors in Rm,
y1 ≦ y2 ⇐⇒ y1i ≤ y
2
i for all i = 1, 2, ....m.
y1 ≤ y2 ⇐⇒ y1 ≦ y2 and not y2 ≦ y1.
Equivalently,
y1 ≤ y2 ⇐⇒ y1i ≤ y
2
i for all i = 1, ...,m
and
y1j < y
2
j for some j ∈ {1, ...,m}.
y1 < y2 ⇐⇒ y1i < y
2
i for all i = 1, 2, ....m.
y1 = y2 ⇐⇒ y1i = y
2
i for all i = 1, 2, ....m.
The relations ≧, ≥ and > are defined in an analogous manner. Further, we denote
the nonnegative and positive orthant of Rm by
Rm
≧
= {y ∈ Rm : y ≧ 0}
Rm> = {y ∈ R
m : y > 0}.
Let A, B ⊆ Rm. Set addition of A and B is given by the set C ∈ Rm, defined as
C = A+B = {x+ y : x ∈ X and y ∈ Y }.
Similarly for y ∈ Rm and A ⊆ Rm, we define the set y +A ⊆ Rm as
y +A = {y + x : x ∈ A}.
3.2 Binary Relations and Orders
Binary relations are ways of describing relationships between two entities.
Mathematical theory of binary relations plays an important role in multi-criteria
optimization. Any decision process requires comparing different alternatives. Binary
relations define the relationship between pairs of alternatives of a given set.
Definition 3.1. Let S be a set. A binary relation on S is a subset R of S × S,
where S × S = {(s1, s2) | s1, s2 ∈ S}. If (s1, s2) ∈ R, we write s1Rs2.
Binary relations possessing certain properties are defined accordingly.
Let R be a binary relation on a set S. R is called
1. Reflexive, if sRs for all s ∈ S,
2. Irreflexive, if not sRs for all s ∈ S,
3. Symmetric, if s1Rs2 =⇒ s2Rs1 for all s1, s2 ∈ S,
4. Asymmetric, if s1Rs2 =⇒ not s2Rs1 for all s1, s2 ∈ S,
5. Antisymmetric, if s1Rs2 and s2Rs1 =⇒ s1 = s2 for all s1, s2 ∈ S,
6. Transitive, if s1Rs2 and s2Rs3 =⇒ s1Rs3 for all s1, s2, s3 ∈ S,
7. Connected, if s1Rs2 or s2Rs1 for all s1, s2 ∈ S, s1 6= s2,
8. Strongly connected(total), if s1Rs2 or s2Rs1 for all s1, s2 ∈ S.
In the definitions that follow, R is a binary relation on a set S.
Definition 3.2. R is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive, symmetric and tran-
sitive.
Definition 3.3. R is a preorder if it is reflexive and transitive.
Definition 3.4. R is a weak order if it is reflexive, symmetric and connected.
Definition 3.5. R is a partial order if it is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive.
Definition 3.6. R is a strict partial order if it is asymmetric and transitive.
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3.3 Formulation of the Multi-criteria Optimization Problem
A multi-criteria problem, in general, is concerned with the optimization of
two or more criterion (objective) functions subject to certain constraints on the
decision variables. The term ‘optimization’subsumes both maximization and mini-
mization problems. We consider the problem of optimizing functions fi, where the
fi are m real-valued functions called criteria or objective functions and m ≥ 2.
Maximizing a function is equivalent to minimizing the negative of the same func-
tion. Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume a multi-criteria optimization
problem to be one in which all the criteria are to be minimized. A multi-criteria
optimization problem, then, can be written in the form
(MCOP): minimize {f1(x), . . . , fm(x)}
subject to x ∈ X ⊆ Rn,
where fi : R
n −→ R are m real-valued functions defined on the domain X ⊆ Rn. If
f = (f1, ...., fm),
the above problem can be represented in vector form as
(MCOP): minimize f(x)
subject to x ∈ X ⊆ Rn.
We refer to either of the above problems as MCOP.
Definition 3.7. A vector x ∈ X is called a feasible decision, X is called the set of
feasible decisions and Rn is referred as the decision space. Analogously, the set Y
given by
Y = f(X) = {y ∈ Rm | y = f(x) for some x ∈ X}
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denotes the set of attainable outcomes in the criteria space Rm.
3.4 Minimizing Multiple Criteria
In single objective minimization problems, we compare the objective values
at different feasible decisions to select the best decision. Decisions are ranked ac-
cording to the objective values at those decisions and the decision resulting in the
least smallest objective value is the most preferred decision.
Similarly, to make the multi-criteria optimization model operational, one needs to
assume certain solution concepts specifying what it means to minimize multiple cri-
teria functions. Attainable outcomes belong to the criteria space Rm; accordingly,
solution concepts are defined by the choice of a preference (order) relation on Rm.
The preference relation allows comparisons of different outcome vectors. More de-
tailed study on classification and properties of multi-criteria optimization can be
found in Ehrgott (1997, 1998).
The preference structure in the criteria space, associated with the underlying
preference relation, is characterized by the relation of weak preference denoted by
,(Chankong and Haimes, 1983).
Closely related to  are two more binary relations, ≺, the relation of strict
preference and ∼=, the relation of indifference. For vectors y1 and y2 ∈ Rm,
y1 ≺ y2 ⇐⇒ y1  y2 and not y2  y1,
y1 ∼= y2 ⇐⇒ y1  y2 and y2  y1.
Pareto preference, lexicographic preference and the max-ordering preference are
some of the important preference relations used to describe minimization of multiple
criteria functions. Pareto preference is the one that is commonly used.
Definition 3.8. A binary relation  defined on Rm is called a rational(Pareto)
preference if it satisfies the properties of
1. reflexivity, y  y for all y ∈ Rm, meaning y is at least as preferred as y;
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2. transitivity, y1  y2 and y2  y3 =⇒ y1  y3, for all y1, y2, y3 ∈ Rm, which,
in terms of preferences, means that if y1 is at least as preferred as y2 and y2
is at least as preferred as y3, then y1 is at least as preferred as y3; and
3. strict monotonicity, y − ǫei ≺ y for all y ∈ Rm, where ǫ > 0 and ei ∈ Rm is
a unit vector with 1 at the i-th positions and 0 elsewhere.
Note that the principle of strict monotonicity implies that reducing one of the com-
ponents by a positive quantity results in a preferred vector.
Definition 3.9. The outcome vector y1 ∈ Y rationally(Pareto) dominates y2 ∈ Y
if and only if y1 ≺ y2 for all rational preference relations . Analogously, a feasible
decision x ∈ X is a Pareto optimal(efficient) solution of MCOP if and only if
y = f(x) is rationally nondominated.
To make it practical, rational preference is defined in terms of vector inequalities.
Definition 3.10. Let y1, y2 ∈ Y, y1 ≺ y2 ⇐⇒ y1 ≤ y2. Analogously, a feasible
decision x0 is a Pareto optimal(efficient) solution of MCOP if and only if ∄x ∈
X,x0 6= x, such that f(x) ≤ f(x0).
The literature on multi-criteria optimization has several other equivalent
definitions of efficiency and nondominance(Ehrgott, 2005). We give the following
definition as it will be used as an alternative when needed.
Definition 3.11. Let x∗ ∈ X. x∗ is an efficient solution of MCOP if f(x) ≦ f(x∗)
for some x ∈ X implies f(x) = f(x∗).
3.5 Equitable Efficiency of Solutions
As already mentioned in the introduction, classical multi-criteria optimiza-
tion assumes the criteria to be incomparable. There are practical instances where
the criteria can be compared directly in the sense that each criterion measures the
same physical outcome. In such cases it is more desirable to treat all the criteria
uniformly than to assign more/less importance to selected ones. Uniform treatment
19
of criteria tends to look for preferences that are symmetrical in the outcome vec-
tor. Equitability of solutions leads to the quest for solutions that lie close to the
absolute-equity hyperplane in the criteria space, Rm. On this hyperplane, all the
criteria achieve the same value. These two features of the desired preference relation
ensure that one does not purposely prefer one criterion over the remaining ones. We
formalize this discussion mathematically.
Let  be a preference relation defined on Rm.
Definition 3.12. (Kostreva and Ogryczak, 1999).  is said to be impartial if
(yπ(1), . . . , yπ(m)) ∼= (y1, . . . , ym) for all y ∈ Y ⊂ R
m,where
π ∈ Π and Π = {π | π is a permutation of the index set I = {1, . . . ,m}}.
Note that ∼=, the relation of indifference can be related to  in the following
manner,
(yπ(1), ....yπ(m)) ∼= (y1, ...., ym) if and only if
(yπ(1), ....yπ(m))  (y1, ...., ym) and (y1, ...., ym)  (yπ(1), ....yπ(m)).
Definition 3.13. (Marshall and Olkin, 1979).  is said to satisfy the ’principle
of transfers,’ if yi > yj =⇒ y − ǫe
i + ǫej ≺ y, for 0 < ǫ < yi − yj , where, y =
(y1, ., yi, ., yj , .., ym) ∈ R
m and ei ∈ Rm is a unit vector whose i-th component is 1.
Definition 3.14. (Kostreva and Ogryczak, 1999). A binary relation  defined
on Rm is called an equitable preference relation if it is reflexive, transitive, strictly
monotonic, impartial and satisfies the principle of transfers.
Here after, we shall denote an equitable preference relation on the outcome
space Y by e.
Efficient solutions for a MCOP are defined in terms of the Pareto preference
relation. Solutions for MCOP defined in terms of equitable preference relations are
called equitably efficient solutions.
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Definition 3.15. Let y1, y2 ∈ Rm be two attainable outcomes. y1 is said to
equitably dominate y2 if and only if y1≺e y
2 for all equitable preference relations,
e, where y
1≺e y
2 if and only if y1e y
2 and not y2e y
1.
An outcome vector y is equitably nondominated if and only if there does not
exist another outcome vector y′ such that y′ equitably dominates y. Analogously,
a feasible decision x0 ∈ X is called an equitably efficient solution of the MCOP
if and only if there does not exist x ∈ X such that f(x)≺e f(x
0) for all equitable
preference relations.
Similar to efficiency, to make it practical, equitable efficiency too can be de-
fined in terms of vector inequalities. In order to do that, we define certain mappings.
Definition 3.16. Let Θ : Rm −→ Rm be a mapping defined as
Θ(y) = (θ1(y), ...., θm(y)), where θ1(y) ≥ θ2(y) ≥ ....,≥ θm(y)
and
θi(y) = yπ(i), where π is some permutation of the set I = {1, ....,m}.
Note that Θ is an ordering map that sorts the components of y in a non-increasing
order.
Definition 3.17. Define the cumulative ordering map on Rm, Θ¯ : Rm −→ Rm as
Θ¯(y) = (θ¯1(y), ...., θ¯m(y)), where
θ¯i(y) =
i∑
j=1
θj(y), for i = 1, ....,m.
Note that the ith coefficient of the vector Θ¯(y) represents the sum of i largest
components of the vector y.
Defining equitable efficiency from the preference point of view is too abstract.
As mentioned in the previous section, equitable efficiency is made operational by
relating the preference relation to vector inequalities in the outcome space.
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Theorem 3.1. (Kostreva et al., 2004). Let y1, y2 be two outcome vectors in Rm.
y1 equitably dominates y2 if and only if Θ¯(y1) ≤ Θ¯(y2).
By Definition 3.17 and Theorem 3.1, it is clear that finding equitably efficient
solutions of MCOP is equivalent to finding efficient solutions of the problem
(COMCOP): minimize (θ¯1(f(x), ...., θ¯m(f(x))
subject to x ∈ X ⊆ Rn,
or
(COMCOP): minimize Θ¯(f(x))
subject to x ∈ X ⊆ Rn.
We refer to either of the above problem as COMCOP, the cumulatively ordered
multi-criteria optimization problem.
Corollary 3.1. (Kostreva et al., 2004). A feasible solution x ∈ X is an equitably
efficient solution of MCOP if and only if it is an efficient solution of COMCOP.
In the following chapter we develop characterizations of equitably efficient
solutions of MCOP in terms of solutions of single objective optimization problems.
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CHAPTER 4
SOME CHARACTERIZATIONS OF EQUITABLY
EFFICIENT SOLUTIONS
Solving any multi-criteria optimization problem implies finding a subset of
the efficient decisions. While there is extensive amount of literature on finding effi-
cient solutions of such problems, the literature on finding equitably efficient solutions
of such problems is not very extensive. Kostreva and Ogryczak (1999) develop a
weighting method of finding equitably efficient solutions of a linear MCOP.
In this chapter we develop some scalarization-based methods to generate equitably
efficient solutions. It is well known that a solution of a minimax optimization prob-
lem is, in general, only weakly efficient for the corresponding multi-criteria prob-
lem(Ehrgott, 2005). We show that under uniqueness condition, the solution is eq-
uitably efficient. We present the two-phase minimax method of finding equitably
efficient solutions regardless of uniqueness.
Questions regarding existence of solutions to any optimization problem are of pri-
mary concern. We prove conditions under which equitably efficient solutions may
not exist for linear multi-criteria problems.
4.1 Scalarizations and Equitable Efficiency
Scalarization is one of the most common approaches used to solve a MCOP.
As discussed earlier, finding an equitably efficient solution of a MCOP is equivalent
to finding an efficient solution to its related COMCOP. Scalarizing functions are
used to transform a given MCOP into a single criterion optimization problem, here
after referred to as SCOP, by aggregating the criteria of a MCOP into a single
criterion. Efficient solutions of the MCOP are then studied in terms of the optimal
solution(s) of the SCOP.
In order to guarantee consistency of the aggregated problem with minimiza-
tion of all the criteria of the MCOP, the scalarizing function must be strictly in-
creasing coordinatewise.
Definition 4.1. (Ehrgott, 2005). Let Y ⊆ Rm. Any function g : Y → R is called
a scalarizing function for Y . Let y1, y2 ∈ Y . The scalarizing function g is strongly
increasing if
y1 ≤ y2 =⇒ g(y1) < g(y2).
Note that strongly increasing functions are strictly increasing componentwise.
Definition 4.2. Let the MCOP with feasible set X ∈ Rn, criteria functions
fi : R
n → R, i = 1, . . . ,m and the strongly increasing scalarizing function g
be given. The SCOP associated with the MCOP is given by
(SCOP) : minimize {g(y) : y ∈ Y = f(X)},
where f = (f1, . . . , fm).
As the feasible set Y in the criteria space is not given explicitly, one deals
with the above problem with feasible decisions in the decision space. In such a case,
the above problem is equivalent to
(SCOP) : minimize {g(f(x)) : x ∈ X}.
Definition 4.3. Let the SCOP associated with the MCOP be given. A feasible
decision x0 ∈ X is said to be an optimal solution of SCOP if
g(f(x0) ≤ g(f(x) for all x ∈ X.
Let g be a strongly increasing scalarizing function. If xˆ ∈ X is an optimal
solution of SCOP, then xˆ is an efficient solution of MCOPEhrgott andWiecek (2005).
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4.1.1 Weighting-sum scalarization
The weighting sum method is one of the most common ways of finding
efficient solutions of MCOP. Details of the method can be found in Geoffrion (1968).
Definition 4.4. The weighting sum scalarization of the MCOP is defined as
W(w): minimize
m∑
i=1
wifi(x)
subject to x ∈ X,
where w ∈ Rm≥ is any given weighting vector.
Note that in this case the scalarizing function g is given by
g(f(x)) =
m∑
i=1
wifi(x).
Analogously, the weighting method for the COMCOP is given by
W(w): minimize
m∑
i=1
wiθ¯i(f(x))
subject to x ∈ X,
where w ∈ Rm≥ is any given weighting vector.
Due to Definitions (3.16) and (3.17) of Θ and Θ¯ respectively, the above problem is
equivalent to
P (λ) : minimize
m∑
i=1
λiθi(f(x))
subject to x ∈ X,
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where λi =
∑i
j=1 wi for i = 1, . . . ,m.
Proposition 4.1. (Kostreva et al., 2004). For any sequence of strictly decreasing
and positive weights {λi}
m
i=1, each optimal solution of P(λ) is an equitably efficient
solution of the MCOP
Proposition 4.2. (Kostreva and Ogryczak, 1999). Suppose the criteria function
fi, i = 1, . . . ,m are linear and the feasible set X of MCOP is defined by a system of
inequalities and equalities. A feasible solution x0 is equitably efficient if and only if,
there exists a sequence of strictly decreasing and positive weights λ1 > λ2 > . . . >
λm > 0, such that x
0 is an optimal solution of problem P (λ).
Proposition 4.3. (Kostreva and Ogryczak, 1999). Suppose the multi-criteria opti-
mization problem is a linear one, in which the criteria functions are linear and the
feasible set X is defined by a system of linear inequalities. If the problem has an
efficient solution, it has an equitably efficient solution.
4.1.2 Minimax scalarization
One of the most common approaches to building a single-criterion optimiza-
tion problem from a given MCOP is by using some kind of norm function as the
scalarizing function. Based on certain properties of the norm defining the scalariza-
tion, we are able to generate a weekly efficient or an efficient decision for the MCOP.
The minimax scalarization corresponds to the lp norm of a vector when p −→ ∞.
Definition 4.5. For the MCOP, its associated min-max scalarization is defined as
(MINIMAX): minimize max
i=1,...,m
fi(x)
subject to x ∈ X.
In case the MINIMAX problem has alternate optimal solutions, one of these
solutions is efficient. In case the solution is unique, it is efficient for the MCOP,
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Kouvelis and Yu (1997). We show that in case of an unique optimal solution for the
MINIMAX problem, the solution is equitably efficient for the MCOP.
Proposition 4.4. Let x∗ be the unique optimal solution of MINIMAX, then x∗ is
an equitably efficient solution of MCOP.
Proof. : Let z = maxi=1,...,m fi(x), then problem MINIMAX is equivalent to
(MINIMAX) : minimize {z : x ∈ X, fi(x) ≤ z, i = 1, . . . ,m}.
Let (x∗, z∗) uniquely solve MINIMAX, then
z∗ = minimize {z : x ∈ X, fi(x) ≤ z, i = 1, . . . ,m}.
Hence
fi(x
∗) ≤ z∗ for all i = 1, . . . ,m (4.1)
and
fj(x
∗) = z∗ for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Assume x∗ is not an equitably efficient solution of MCOP, then there exists some
x0 in X, x0 6= x∗, such that
θ¯i(f(x
0)) ≤ θ¯i(f(x
∗))
for all i = 1, . . . ,m with strict inequality for at least one i.
In particular, consider
θ¯1(f(x
0)) ≤ θ¯1(f(x
∗)).
If
θ¯1(f(x
0)) = θ¯1(f(x
∗)),
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then by definitions (3.16) and (3.17) of θi and θ¯i respectively and from (4.1), we
get
max
i=1,...,m
fi(x
0) = max
i=1,...,m
fi(x
∗)
≤ z∗ (4.2)
= min z
≤ z.
If
θ¯1(f(x
0) < θ¯1f(x
∗)
then
max
i=1,...,m
fi(x
0) < max
i=1,...,m
fi(x
∗)
≤ z∗
= min z (4.3)
≤ z.
From (4.2) and (4.3), we have
max
i=1,...,m
fi(x
0) ≤ z∗
≤ z.
But
max
i=1,...,m
fi(x
0) ≤ z∗ =⇒ fi(x
0) ≤ z (4.4)
for all i = 1, . . . ,m and x0 ∈ X.
equation (4.4) implies that x0 is feasible for MINIMAX.
28
Let z0 be the value of MINIMAX at decision x0, then
z0 = min z,
where
fi(x
0) ≤ z0
for all i = 1, . . . ,m and
fj(x
0) = z0 (4.5)
for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
From (4.4) and (4.5), we get
fj(x
0) = z0
≤ max
i=1,...,m
fi(x
0)
≤ z∗.
z0 ≤ z∗ implies that x∗ is not the unique optimal solution of MINIMAX, a contra-
diction. Hence x∗ is an equitably efficient solution of the MCOP.
Proposition (4.4) can be used to find an equitably efficient solution provided
the solution of the related minimax problem is known to be unique. An instance,
where uniqueness is guaranteed is when the objective functions of the multi-criteria
optimization problem are all strictly convex and the feasible region is convex. For a
bicriteria problem(Yu, 1973) derives conditions for Pareto optimality in the criteria
space under which the minimax problem has a unique solution. In general, however,
uniqueness can not be verified(Marler and Arora, 2004). Regardless of uniqueness,
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in the proposition that follows, we prove that the two-phase method(Kouvelis and
Yu, 1997) can be utilized to find an equitably efficient solution of the related multi-
criteria problem. We prove a lemma which is needed in the proof of the proposition
that follows.
Lemma 4.1. Let y1, y2 ∈ Rm. If maxi=1,...,m y
1
i = maxi=1,...,m y
2
i
and Θ¯(y1) ≤ Θ¯(y2), then θ¯m(y
1) < θ¯m(y
2).
Proof. : Without loss of generality, let
y1 = (y11, . . . , y
1
m) and y
2 = (y21, . . . , y
2
m) where
y11 ≥ . . . ≥ y
1
m and y
2
1 ≥ . . . ≥ y
2
m.
By assumption
y11 = max
i=1,...,m
y1i = y
2
1 = max
i=1,...,m
y2i . (4.6)
If j = 2, then
θ¯j(y
1) ≤ θ¯j(y
2) =⇒ y11 + y
1
2 ≤ y
2
1 + y
2
2
=⇒ y12 ≤ y
2
2, by (4.6).
Proceeding inductively, it is clear that for every j > 1 the inequalities
θ¯j(y
1) ≤ θ¯j(y
2) =⇒ y1j ≤ y
2
j
and
θ¯k(y
1) < θ¯k(y
2) for some k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}
imply that y1k < y
2
k.
The arguments presented above show that under the conditions stated in the lemma
θ¯m(y
1) =
m∑
i=1
y1i <
m∑
i=1
y2i = θ¯m(y
2)
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Proposition 4.5. Let z˜ be the optimal objective value of MINIMAX problem. Con-
sider the problem
(SUM): minimize
m∑
i=1
fi(x)
subject to fi(x) ≤ z˜
x ∈ X.
If x∗ is an optimal solution of problem SUM, then x∗ is an equitably efficient solution
of MCOP.
Proof. Since z˜ is the optimal objective value of minimax,
fi(x) ≤ z˜, ∀x ∈ X and i = 1, . . . ,m.
fi(x) ≤ z˜ =⇒ max
i=1,...,m
fi(x) ≤ z˜, ∀x ∈ X. (4.7)
Let x∗ be an optimal solution of SUM. Suppose x∗ is not an equitably efficient
solution of MCOP, then x∗ is not an efficient solution of COMCOP and there exists
some x0 6= x∗ ∈ X such that Θ¯(f(x0)) dominates Θ¯(f(x∗)). Hence
θ¯i(f(x
0)) ≤ θ¯i(f(x
∗)) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (4.8)
In particular, for i = 1,
θ¯1(f(x
0)) ≤ θ¯1(f(x
∗))
=⇒ max
i=1,...,m
fi(x
0) ≤ max
i=1,...,m
fi(x
∗)
≤ z˜, by (4.7).
If
max
i=1,...,m
fi(x
0) < max
i=1,...,m
fi(x
∗) ≤ z˜
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then x0 provides a smaller objective value to minimax problem than z˜, the optimal
objective value. Hence
max
i=1,...,m
fi(x
0) = max
i=1,...,
fi(x
∗) ≤ z˜. (4.9)
From (4.8), (4.9) and Lemma (4.1), we get
θ¯m(f(x
0)) < θ¯m(f(x
∗))
=⇒
m∑
i=1
fi(x
0) <
m∑
i=1
fi(x
∗). (4.10)
Inequality (4.10) contradicts the optimality of x∗ for SUM.
Corollary 4.1. Every optimal solution of the problem
minimize
m∑
i=1
fi(x)
subject to fi(x) ≤ z
∗, x ∈ X,
where z∗ = minx∈X maxi=1,...,m fi(x), is an equitably efficient solution of MCOP.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 4.4 and 4.5.
4.1.3 Benson scalarization
Benson (1978) scalarization is often used to investigate the efficiency of a
given feasible decision. In this section we utilize Benson’s scalarizations on the
ordered objectives to characterize equitably efficient solutions of a multi-criteria
optimization problem with the solution of single-criterion problem. Further, we
also prove a result which shows that equitably efficient solutions to a multi-criteria
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problem may not exist under certain assumptions on the criteria functions and the
feasible region.
Definition 4.6. Given any feasible decision x0 ∈ X, Benson’s scalarization of the
MCOP is defined as
(BENSON) : maximize
m∑
i=1
ǫi
subject to fi(x
0)− fi(x) = ǫi, i = 1, . . . ,m
ǫi ≥ 0, x ∈ X.
As in Yager (1988), we call following multi-criteria optimization problem
(OWA) : minimize {θ1(f(x)), . . . , θm(f(x))}
subject to x ∈ X
where,
f = (f1, . . . , fm) : R
m −→ R
and
Θ = (θ1, . . . , θm) : R
m −→ R,
as defined in Definition (3.16), is an ordering map on Rm, OWA, the ordered
weighted averaging problem.
Consider the scalarization of OWA given by
P (ǫ) : maximize
m∑
i=1
ǫi
subject to θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x)) = ǫi, i = 1, . . . ,m
ǫi ≥ 0, x ∈ X,
where x0 is any given feasible decision in X and θi’s are as defined in Definition
(3.16).
Theorem 4.1. x0 ∈ X is an equitably efficient solution of MCOP if and only if the
optimal objective value of P (ǫ) is zero.
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Proof. : For x0 ∈ X, P (ǫ) is feasible with ǫ = 0.
ǫi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m =⇒
m∑
i=1
ǫi ≥ 0.
Hence, the optimal objective value of P (ǫ) ≥ 0.
Let ǫ = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫm) be such that the vector (x, ǫ) is feasible for P (ǫ). Feasibility
of (x, ǫ) for P (ǫ) implies ǫi ≥ 0.
ǫi ≥ 0 =⇒ θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x)) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m (4.11)
and
max
m∑
i=1
ǫi ≥ 0. (4.12)
Let the optimal objective value of P (ǫ) be zero, then, by nonnegativity of ǫ, ǫi = 0
for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Due to definition of P (ǫ),
ǫ = 0 =⇒ θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x)) = 0, for all i = 1, . . . ,m
=⇒ θi(f(x
0)) = θi(f(x)), for all i = 1, . . . ,m. (4.13)
By Definition (3.17)
θ¯i =
i∑
j=1
θj , for i = 1, . . . ,m.
Hence from (4.13), we get
θ¯i(f(x
0))) = θ¯i(f(x)) for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
So, if there is some x ∈ X such that θ¯i(f(x) ≦ θ¯i(f(x
0)), then θ¯i(f(x)) = θ¯i(f(x
0))
for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
Hence, by Definition (3.17), x0 is an efficient solution of OWAP and by Corollary
(3.17), x0 is an equitably efficient solution of MCOP.
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Conversely, let x0 be an equitably efficient solution of MCOP. Let ǫ̂ denote the
optimal objective value of P (ǫ) attained at some optimal decision x̂. Suppose ǫ̂ > 0.
ǫ̂ > 0 =⇒ max
m∑
i=1
ǫi > 0 (4.14)
=⇒
m∑
i=1
ǫi > 0 (4.15)
=⇒ ǫi > 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (4.16)
and
ǫi ≥ 0 for all other i. (4.17)
Using the definition of P (ǫ) together with (4.16) and (4.17) we get
θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x̂)) > 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and
θj(f(x
0))− θj(f(x̂)) ≥ 0 for all other i. (4.18)
By definition of θ¯i, θ¯i =
∑i
j=1 θj , hence from (4.18) we get
θ¯i(f(x
0))− θ¯i(f(x̂)) > 0 for at least one i ∈, {1, . . . ,m}
and
θ¯i(f(x
0))− θ¯i(f(x̂)) ≥ 0 for all other i. (4.19)
Now, (4.19) implies that x0 is not an efficient solution of COMCOP. Hence it is not
an equitably efficient solution of MCOP, a contradiction.
4.1.4 Existence of equitably efficient
35
solutions for linear MCOPs
Question of existence of equitably efficient solutions is dealt withinKostreva
and Ogryczak (1999). In this article, the authors show that for a linear multi-criteria
optimization problem, if the set of efficient solutions is nonempty, then the set of
equitably efficient solutions is nonempty too. In the theorem that follows, we show
that under unboundedness of the Benson problem, the equitably efficient set of a
linear multi-criteria problem is empty.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose the criteria functions fi, i = 1, . . . ,m, of the MCOP are
linear and the feasible set X is defined by a system of linear equalities and inequali-
ties. If the optimal objective value of P (ǫ) is not finite, then MCOP has no equitably
efficient solution.
Proof. Since P (ǫ) is unbounded, for every real number M ≥ 0, there exists some
xM ∈ X such that
ǫi = θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
M )) ≥ 0 (4.20)
and
m∑
i=1
ǫi =
m∑
i=1
(θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
M ))) > M. (4.21)
Suppose x′ is an equitably efficient solution of MCOP, from Proposition (4.2) there
exists a sequence of weights λ1 > λ2 > . . . λm > 0 such that x
′ is an optimal
solution of
minimize
m∑
i=1
λi θi(f(x))
subject to x ∈ X. (4.22)
For such a sequence of weights,
m∑
i=1
λi (θi(f(x))− θi(f(x
′))) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X. (4.23)
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Since x0 ∈ X, (4.23) implies that
m∑
i=1
λi (θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
′))) ≥ 0. (4.24)
Let λ = λm. LetM
′ > 0 be any fixed but arbitrary real number. LetM = M
′
λ
≥ 0.
From (4.20) and (4.21), for such an M , there exists some xM ∈ X such that
ǫi = θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
M )) ≥ 0 (4.25)
and
m∑
i=1
ǫi =
m∑
i=1
(θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
M ))) > M. (4.26)
If
m∑
i=1
(θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
M ))) > M
then
λ
m∑
i=1
(θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
M ))) > λM
=
M ′
M
M
=M ′
≥ 0. (4.27)
Since λ = λm < λi for all i = 1, . . . ,m− 1, (4.27) gives
m∑
i=1
λi (θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
M ))) > λ
m∑
i=1
(θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
M )))
> M ′
≥ 0. (4.28)
From (4.24)
m∑
i=1
λi (θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
′))) ≥ 0.
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Since M ′ ≥ 0 is arbitrary, setting
M ′ =
m∑
i=1
λi (θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
′)) ≥ 0 in (4.28)
we get
m∑
i=1
λi (θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
′))) <
m∑
i=1
λi (θi(f(x
0))− θi(f(x
M )))
=⇒
m∑
i=1
−λi θi(f(x
′)) <
m∑
i=1
−λi θi(f(x
M )). (4.29)
Because λi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m, from (4.29) we get
m∑
i=1
λi θi(f(x
M )) <
m∑
i=1
λi θi(f(x
′)). (4.30)
Then, (4.30) implies that x′ is not an optimal solution of (4.22), a contradiction.
Hence MCOP does not have an equitably efficient solution.
4.2 Equitable Scalarizations
Any optimal solution of SCOP is an efficient solution of MCOP if the scalar-
izing function is strongly increasing(Ehrgott and Wiecek, 2005). We show that
scalarizing functions with additional properties may be used to find equitably effi-
cient solutions.
Definition 4.7. Let
g : Y ⊆ Rm −→ R
be a scalarizing function defined on Y .
g is said to be symmetric if g(y1, . . . , ym) = g(yτ(1), . . . , yτ(m)
for every permutation τ of the index set I = {1, . . . ,m}.
Definition 4.8. Let y = (y1, . . . , ym) and yi > yj for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
g is said to satisfy the principle of transfers if
g(y1, . . . , yi − ǫ, . . . , yj + ǫ, . . . , ym) < g(y1, . . . , yi, . . . , yj , . . . , ym)
for 0 < ǫ < yi − yj .
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Definition 4.8 expresses the fact that transferring a small amount from a
better to a worse component results in a more preferred outcome vector.
If g is symmetric and satisfies the principle of transfers, then it is called
strictly Schur-convex. Scalarizations of MCOP defined in terms of functions that
are strongly increasing and strictly Schur-convex are ‘equitable scalarizations’. In
case g is an equitable scalarization function, every optimal solution of SCOP is an
equitably efficient solution of MCOP(Kostreva et al., 2004).
In this section, we present some equitable scalarizations and prove that they define
strictly Schur-convex scalarizing functions.
4.2.1 Exponential Schur scalarization
For any y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ Y , consider the scalarizing function defined as
(ESS): ; g(y) =
m∑
i=1
eayi
where
yi = fi(x), x ∈ X and a > 0.
We show that ESS defines an equitable scalarization on Y .
1. Let y1 ≤ y2, where
y1 = (y11, . . . , y
1
m) and y
2 = (y21, . . . , y
2
m) ∈ Y,
y1 ≤ y2 =⇒ y1i ≤ y
2
i ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and y
1 6= y2. (4.31)
Since a > 0, from (4.31) we get
ay1i ≤ ay
2
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
ay1j < ay
2
j for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (4.32)
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From (4.32)
eay
1
i ≤ eay
2
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
eay
1
j < eay
2
j for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Summing (4.32) over the index set {1, . . . ,m}, we get
m∑
i=1
eay
1
i <
m∑
i=1
eay
2
i
=⇒ g(y1) < g(y2). (4.33)
Inequality (4.33) implies that g is strongly increasing.
2. Let T be the set of permutations of the set I = {1, . . . ,m}. For any τ ∈ T
g(yτ(1), . . . , yτ(m)) =
m∑
i=1
eayτ(i)
=
m∑
i=1
eayi
= g(y1, . . . , ym). (4.34)
Inequality (4.34) shows that g is symmetric. Finally, we show that g satisfies
the principle of transfers.
3. Let y1 = (y11, . . . , y
1
m) ∈ Y where y
1
i > y
1
j for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Since g is symmetric, we can assume y1i = y
1
1 and y
1
j = y
1
2.
Let 0 < ǫ < y11 − y
1
2.
Consider the vector y2 obtained by transferring ǫ from y11 to y
1
2 keeping other
components the same,
y2 = (y11 − ǫ, y
1
2 + ǫ, . . . , y
1
m).
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By assumption, 0 < ǫ < y11 − y
1
2. Since a > 0, 0 < aǫ < a(y
1
1 − y
1
2). Then
a(y11 − y
1
2) > aǫ =⇒ e
a(y11−y
1
2) > eaǫ
=⇒
eay
1
1
eay
1
2
> eaǫ
=⇒
eay
1
1
eaǫ
> eay
1
2 (4.35)
and
aǫ > 0 =⇒ eaǫ > e0 = 1
=⇒ 1− eaǫ < 0. (4.36)
Multiplying (4.35) by (1− eaǫ) and using (4.36) we get
eay
1
1
eaǫ
(1− eaǫ) < eay
1
2 (1− eaǫ)
=⇒ eay
1
1 (e−aǫ − 1) < eay
1
2 (1− eaǫ)
=⇒ ea(y
1
1−ǫ) − eay
1
1 < eay
1
2 − ea(y
1
2+ǫ)
=⇒ ea(y
1
1−ǫ) + ea(y
1
2+ǫ) < eay
1
1 + eay
1
2 . (4.37)
Inequality (4.37) implies
ea(y
1
1−ǫ) + ea(y
1
2+ǫ)+
(eay
1
3 + . . .+ eay
1
m) < eay
1
1 + eay
1
2+
(eay
1
3 + . . .+ eay
1
m)
=⇒ g(y11 − ǫ, y
1
2 + ǫ, . . . , y
1
m) < g(y
1
1, y
1
2, . . . , y
1
m)
=⇒ g(y2) < g(y1). (4.38)
Inequality (4.38) implies that g satisfies the principle of transfers. Thus g is strongly
increasing, symmetric and satisfies the principle of transfers. Hence, it defines an
equitable scalarization on the outcome space Y .
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4.2.2 Squared-sum Schur scalarization
Let
ai = min
x∈X
fi(x)
and
a < min
i=1,...,m
ai.
For any y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ Y , consider the scalarizing function defined as
(SSSS) : g(y1, . . . , ym) =
m∑
i=1
(yi − a)
2, where yi = fi(x), x ∈ X.
We prove that (SSSS) is an equitable scalarization.
1. Let y1 ≤ y2 where
y1 = (y11, . . . , y
1
m) and y
2 = (y21, . . . , y
2
m) ∈ Y
and
y1 ≤ y2 =⇒ y1i ≤ y
2
i ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and y
1 6= y2. (4.39)
By assumption
a < y1i and a < y
2
i ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (4.40)
Inequality (4.40) implies
0 < y1i − a and 0 < y
2
i − a ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (4.41)
From (4.39) and (4.41)
(y1i − a)
2 ≤ (y2i − a)
2 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and
(y1j − a)
2 < (y2j − a)
2 for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (4.42)
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Summing both sides of (4.42) yields
m∑
i=1
(y1i − a)
2 <
m∑
i=1
(y2i − a)
2
=⇒ g(y11, . . . , y
1
m) < g(y
2
1, . . . , y
2
m)
=⇒ g(y1) < g(y2) (4.43)
Inequality (4.43) implies g is strongly increasing.
2. Let τ be the vector denoting any permutation of the index set I = {1, . . . ,m},
then
g(yτ(1), . . . , yτ(m) =
m∑
i=1
(yτ(i) − a)
2
=
m∑
i=1
(yi − a)
2
= g(y1, . . . , ym). (4.44)
Inequality (4.44) implies that g is symmetric.
3. Let y1 = (y11, . . . , y
1
m) ∈ Y where y
1
i > y
1
j for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Without loss of generality, let i > j, i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be such that y1i > y
1
j .
Let 0 < ǫ < y1i − y
1
j and y
2 be the vector obtained from y1 by transferring ǫ
from y1i to y
1
j keeping other components the same,
y2 = (y11, . . . , y
1
i − ǫ, . . . , y
1
j + ǫ, . . . , y
1
m).
Note that y1i − y
1
j = −(y
1
j − y
1
i ) = −((y
1
j − a)− (y
1
i − a)). Then
y1i − y
1
j = −((y
1
j − a)− (y
1
i − a) > ǫ
=⇒ −2((y1j − a)− (y
1
i − a)) > 2ǫ.
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Since ǫ > 0, the above inequality implies
−2ǫ((y1j − a)− (y
1
i − a)) > 2ǫ
2
=⇒ 2ǫ2 + 2ǫ{(y1j − a)− (y
1
i − a)} < 0
=⇒ 2ǫ2 + 2ǫ(y1j − a)− 2ǫ(y
1
i − a) < 0. (4.45)
From (4.45)
2ǫ2 + 2ǫ(y1j − a)− 2ǫ(y
1
i − a) +
(y11 − a)
2 + . . .+ (y1m − a)
2 < (y11 − a)
2 + . . .
+(y1m − a)
2. (4.46)
Regrouping terms in (4.46), keeping together terms involving y1i and y
1
j gives
(y11 − a)
2 + . . .+ (2ǫ2 + 2ǫ(y1j − a)−
2ǫ(y1i − a) + (y
1
i − a)
2 + (y1j − a)
2) +
. . .+ (y1m − a)
2 < (y11 − a)
2 + . . .+ (y1m − a)
2
=⇒ (y11 − a)
2 + . . .+ (y1j − a+ ǫ)
2 +
(y1i − a− ǫ)
2 + . . .+ (y1m − a)
2 < (y11 − a)
2 +
. . . (y1m − a)
2. (4.47)
Equivalently,
(y11 − a)
2 + . . .+ (y1i − ǫ− a)
2 +
(y1j + ǫ− a)
2 + . . .+ (y1m − a)
2 <
(y11 − a)
2 + . . . (y1m − a)
2
=⇒ g(y11 − a, . . . , y
1
i − ǫ− a, . . .+
y1j + ǫ− a+ . . .+ y
1
m − a)
2 <
g(y11 − a, . . . , y
1
m − a). (4.48)
From (4.48)
g(y2) < g(y1), (4.49)
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g satisfies the principle of transfers.
Proposition 4.6. If a > 0, then every optimal solution of
minimize
m∑
i=1
eafi(x)
subject to x ∈ X
is an equitably efficient solution of MCOP.
Proof. From section 4.2.1,
∑m
i=1 e
afi(x) is an equitable scalarization defined on the
outcome space Y . Hence every optimal solution of
minimize
m∑
i=1
eafi(x), subject to x ∈ X
is an equitably efficient solution of MCOP(Kostreva et al., 2004).
Proposition 4.7. Every optimal solution of
minimize
m∑
i=1
(fi(x)− a)
2 (4.50)
subject to x ∈ X (4.51)
where a < mini=1,...,m ai and ai = minx∈X fi(x), is an equitably efficient solution of
MCOP.
Proof. For a defined according to the conditions in the proposition,
∑m
i=1 (fi(x)−a)
2
defines an equitable scalarization on the outcome space Y , section 4.2.2. Hence every
optimal solution of
minimize
m∑
i=1
(fi(x)− a)
2, subject to x ∈ X
is an equitably efficient solution of MCOP(Kostreva et al., 2004).
Stressing the relevance of equitably efficient solutions is the focus of the next chapter.
In this chapter we present equitably efficient solutions in relation to solutions of
matrix game and linear complementarity problems.
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:
CHAPTER 5
MATRIX GAMES, LINEAR COMPLEMENTARITY
PROBLEMS AND EQUITABLE EFFICIENCY
Matrix games or two-person zero-sum games are games with only two par-
ticipants in which one participant wins what the other loses. The first attempt to
formalize a theory of such games was made by Borel (1921, 1924, 1927). Later a
strong foundation of the theory was laid by Neumann (1928) who gave the cele-
brated ”Minimax Theorem” for such games. Linear Complementarity problem, on
the other hand, is a general problem which unifies linear and quadratic programs
and bimatrix games(Murty, 1988).
In this chapter we present multi-criteria formulations of matrix games and
linear complementarity problems and study the relationships between solutions of
the latter two problems and equitably efficient solutions of the related multi-criteria
problem . For the matrix game, we show that a solution of the game can be obtained
by finding an equitably efficient solution of the multi-criteria problem. Solutions
of the linear complementarity problem, on the other hand, can be identified as
equitably efficient solutions that have specific values for the objective functions.
5.1 Matrix Games and Equitable Efficiency
A matrix game τ is defined by a real m × n matrix A along with the
cartesian product X × Y , where X = {x ∈ Rm |xi ≥ 0,
∑m
i=1 xi = 1} and
Y = {y ∈ Rn | yi ≥ 0,
∑n
j=1 yj = 1}. x ∈ X is called a mixed strategy for the
row player and y ∈ Y a mixed strategy for the column player. For i = 1, . . . ,m,
the mixed strategy with 1 at the ith position and 0 elsewhere is called the ith pure
strategy for the row player. A similar definition of pure strategy holds for the column
player.
Definition 5.1. If (x, y) ∈ X × Y , then the payoff associated with the strategy
(x, y) is given by E(x, y) =
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1 xiaijyj .
Definition 5.2. A solution of the matrix game τ is a pair of mixed strategies
x¯ = (x¯1, . . . , x¯m), y¯ = (y¯1, . . . , y¯n) and a real number v such that xAy¯
t ≤ x¯Ay¯t =
v ≤ x¯Ayt. x¯ is called an optimal strategy for the row player and y¯, an optimal
strategy for the column player. v is called the value of the game.
Theorem 5.1. (Chv´atal, 2000). For any matrix game τ defined by the m×n matrix
A, there exist optimal strategies x∗, y∗ for the row and column players respectively
such that
min
y
x∗Ayt = max
x
xAy∗t
with the minimum taken over all y ∈ Y and maximum taken over all x ∈ X.
As shown in Chv´atal (2000), finding an optimal strategy to the matrix game
is equivalent to solving the following linear programming problems:
(LP ) maximize v
s.t. v −
m∑
i=1
xiaij ≤ 0 , j = 1, . . . , n,
m∑
i=1
xi = 1,
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m
and
(LD) minimize w
s.t. w −
n∑
j=1
aijyj ≥ 0 , i = 1, . . . ,m,
n∑
j=1
yj = 1,
yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n.
Note that LP and LD are duals of one another.
We formulate the matrix game problem as expressed by LP and LD as a
biobjective problem and look at the relationship of solutions between the two prob-
lems. Toward this end, consider the biobjective optimization problem formulated
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as
(BOP ) minimize{−v, w}
s.t. v −
m∑
i=1
xiaij ≤ 0 , j = 1, . . . , n,
w −
n∑
j=1
aijyj ≥ 0 , i = 1, . . . ,m,
m∑
i=1
xi = 1,
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
n∑
j=1
yj = 1,
yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n.
Let χ denote the feasible set of the above BOP.
Theorem 5.2. Let (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗), where (x∗, v∗) ∈ Rm+1 and (y∗, w∗) ∈ Rn+1 solve
the matrix game τ , then (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗) is an equitably efficient solution of BOP.
Proof. If (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗) solves the matrix game A, then (x∗, v∗) solves LP and
(y∗, w∗) solves LD.
If (x∗, v∗) solves LP, then by feasibility
v∗ ≤
m∑
i=1
x∗i aij , ∀j = 1, . . . , n, (5.1)
m∑
i=1
x∗i = 1, x
∗
i ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m (5.2)
and as (y∗, w∗) solves LD
w∗ ≥
n∑
j=1
aijy
∗
j , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, (5.3)
n∑
j=1
y∗j = 1, y
∗
j ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , n. (5.4)
Inequalities (5.1)-(5.4) imply that (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗) is a feasible solution of BOP. Sup-
pose (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗) is not an equitably efficient solution of BOP, then, by Corollary
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3.1, (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗) is not an efficient solution of the problem
minimize {θ¯1(−v, w), θ¯2(−v, w) |x ∈ χ}.
Hence, there exists some (x, v, y, w) ∈ χ such that (−v, w) dominates (−v∗, w∗) in
the objective space.
If (−v, w) dominates (−v∗, w∗) then
θ¯i(−v, w) ≤ θ¯i(−v
∗, w∗) for i = 1, 2 (5.5)
and
θ¯j(−v, w) < θ¯j(−v
∗, w∗) for at least one j ∈ {1, 2}. (5.6)
By definition of θ¯, θ¯i(f(x)) =
∑i
j=1 θj(f(x)), where the vector θ(f(x)) denotes
the components of the vector f(x) sorted in a nonincreasing order. Applying this
definition to the vectors (−v, w) and (−v∗, w∗), we get
θ¯1(−v, w) = max{−v, w}, (5.7)
θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗) = max{−v∗, w∗}, (5.8)
θ¯2(−v, w) = −v + w (5.9)
θ¯2(−v
∗, w∗) = −v∗ + w∗. (5.10)
Since (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗) solves the matrix game, (x∗, v∗) and (y∗, w∗) solve LP and LD
respectively. As LP and LD are dual to each other, by the strong duality theorem,
v∗ = w∗. With v∗ = w∗, 5.10 gives θ¯2(−v
∗, w∗) = 0. If strict inequality in (5.6)
holds for j = 2, then combining (5.6) and (5.10), we get
θ¯2(−v, w) = −v + w < θ¯2(−v
∗, w∗) = 0
=⇒ w < v. (5.11)
If (x, v, y, w) is feasible to BOP, then (x, v) and (y, w) are feasible to LP and LD
respectively. So we have feasible solutions to two dual LPs such that the objective
value of the min problem is strictly less than the objective value of the max problem.
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This contradicts the weak duality theorem. Hence, strict inequality in (5.6) can not
hold for j = 2.
If j = 1 in (5.6), then from (5.6)-(5.8), we get
θ¯1(−v, w) = max{−v, w} < θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗) = max{−v∗, w∗}. (5.12)
In (5.12), we have the following possibilities:
Case 1.
max{−v, w} = −v, max{−v∗, w∗} = −v∗, then
−v < −v∗ =⇒ v > v∗.
We have a feasible point (x, v) of LP at which the objective value is strictly greater
than the objective value at (x∗, v∗). This contradicts the optimality of (x∗, v∗) for
LP.
Case 2.
max{−v, w} = −v, max{−v∗, w∗} = w∗, then
w ≤ −v < w∗ =⇒ w < w∗.
Now we have a feasible point (y, w) of LD at which the objective value is strictly
less than the objective value at (y∗, w∗). This contradicts the optimality of (y∗, w∗)
for LD.
Case 3.
max{−v, w} = w, max{−v∗, w∗} = −v∗, then
−v ≤ w < −v∗ =⇒ v > v∗.
Again we arrive at a contradiction to (x∗, v∗) being an optimal solution of LP.
Case 4.
max{−v, w} = w, max{−v∗, w∗} = w∗, then
−v ≤ w < w∗ =⇒ w < w∗.
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The above contradicts the optimality of (y∗, w∗) for LD.
In all the possible cases, we arrive at contradictions. Hence, the inequality in 5.6
can not hold for j = 1 too and our assumption about (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗) can not be
true.
Theorem 5.3. If (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗) is an equitably efficient solution of BOP, then it
solves the matrix game τ .
Proof. Suppose (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗) is an equitably efficient solution of BOP but is not a
solution of the matrix game, then there exists some (x˜, v˜) feasible to LP and (y˜, w˜)
feasible to LD respectively such that
−v˜ ≤ −v∗ and w˜ ≤ w∗ with strict inequality for at least one of them. (5.13)
Inequality (5.13) implies that
−v˜ + w˜ < −v∗ + w∗. (5.14)
If (x˜, v˜) is feasible to LP and (y˜, w˜) is feasible to LD, then the point (x˜, v˜, y˜, w˜) is a
feasible point of the BOP.
By definition of θ¯,
θ¯1(−v˜, w˜) = θ1(−v˜, w˜) = max{−v˜, w˜}, (5.15)
θ¯2(−v˜, w˜) = θ1(−v˜, w˜) + θ2(−v˜, w˜) = −v˜ + w˜, (5.16)
θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗) = θ1(−v
∗, w∗) = max{−v∗, w∗} and (5.17)
θ¯2(−v
∗, w∗) = θ1(−v
∗, w∗) + θ2(−v
∗, w∗) = −v∗ + w∗. (5.18)
Combining (5.16) and (5.18) with (5.14), we get
θ¯2(−v˜, w˜) < θ¯2(−v
∗, w∗). (5.19)
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Consider the following possible cases for θ¯1(−v˜, w˜) and θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗) :
Case 1.
θ¯1(−v˜, w˜) = max{−v˜, w˜} = −v˜, (5.20)
θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗) = max{−v∗, w∗} = −v∗. (5.21)
Inequalities (5.13), (5.20) and (5.21) together imply that
θ¯1(−v˜, w˜) ≤ θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗). (5.22)
Case 2.
θ¯1(−v˜, w˜) = max{−v˜, w˜} = −v˜, (5.23)
θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗) = max{−v∗, w∗} = w∗. (5.24)
max{−v∗, w∗} = w∗ =⇒ −v∗ ≤ w∗,
but from (5.13),−v˜ ≤ −v∗. Hence, −v˜ ≤ −v∗ ≤ w∗.
−v˜ ≤ w∗ =⇒ θ¯1(−v˜, w˜) ≤ θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗). (5.25)
Case 3.
θ¯1(−v˜, w˜) = max{−v˜, w˜} = w˜, (5.26)
θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗) = max{−v∗, w∗} = −v∗. (5.27)
Inequality (5.26) implies−v˜ ≤ w˜ and inequality (5.27) implies w∗ ≤ −v∗. Combining
these two inequalities with (5.13) we get
−v˜ ≤ w˜ ≤ w∗ ≤ −v∗.
w˜ ≤ −v∗ =⇒ θ¯1(−v˜, w˜) ≤ θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗). (5.28)
Case 4.
θ¯1(−v˜, w˜) = max{−v˜, w˜} = w˜, (5.29)
θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗) = max{−v∗, w∗} = w∗. (5.30)
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From (5.13), w˜ ≤ w∗, which together with 5.29 and 5.30 implies
θ¯1(−v˜, w˜) ≤ θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗). (5.31)
From (5.22), (5.25), (5.28) and (5.31) we see that
θ¯1(−v˜, w˜) ≤ θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗) (5.32)
for all possible choices of θ¯1(−v˜, w˜) and θ¯1(−v
∗, w∗). Finally, combining (5.19) and
(5.32), we get
θ¯i(−v˜, w˜) ≤ θ¯i(−v
∗, w∗) (5.33)
where strict inequality holds for i = 2.
Inequality (5.33) implies that the point (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗) is dominated by the point
(x˜, v˜, y˜, w˜) in the objective space. Hence (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗) can not be an efficient point
of the problem
minimize {θ¯1(−v, w), θ¯2(−v, w) | x ∈ χ}
and equivalently, by Corollary 3.1, it can not be an equitably efficient solution of
MOP, a contradiction.
Hence, our assumption that (x∗, v∗, y∗, w∗) does not solve the matrix game can not
be true.
5.2 Linear Complementarity Problems and
Equitable Efficiency
Relationships between solutions of linear complementarity problems(LCP)
and multiple criteria optimization problems(MOP) have been described in the works
of several authors. In the literature, the first approach to unify the two seemingly
different concepts seems to be that of Kostreva and Wiecek (1993) where the au-
thors propose the concept of zero-efficient solutions to study LCPs. In(Isac et al.,
1995), the authors propose multiple objective approximation to certain feasible but
unsolvable LCPs. Ebiefung (1995) explores the connections between generalized
LCPs and MOP.
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In this section, we develop conditions by which solutions to a LCP can be identi-
fied as equitably efficient solutions to a related MOP. The results allow us to view
zero efficient points as nothing else but equitably efficient solutions of MOP with
particular objective values.
Given an n × n matrix M and an n × 1 column vector q, LCP (q,M) is to
determine x ∈ Rn satisfying
y =Mx+ q
yi ≥ 0
xi ≥ 0
yixi = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Associated with the LCP, we formulate the following multi-objective problem(MOP)
as in Kostreva and Wiecek[1993].
(MOP) minimize {y1x1, . . . , ynxn}
subject to x ∈ X,
where,
X = {x ∈ Rn|x ≥ 0, y =Mx+ q ≥ 0}.
In addition, let,
fi(x) = yixi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 5.1. Note that in the above MOP formulation, the objective functions are
uniform in the sense that they have the same form. Each function can be thought
of as expressing the same physical outcome. For such a problem, equitably efficient
solutions are more justified than the efficient solutions.
In(Kostreva et al., 2004) the authors show that if x¯ is an efficient solution
of the multiple criteria problem
minimize {f1(x), . . . , fm(x), s.t. x ∈ X}
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and si : R −→ R are strictly increasing scaling functions satisfying the requirement
s1(f1(x¯)) = . . . = sm(fm(x¯)),
then x¯ is an equitably efficient solution of the scaled problem
minimize {s1(f1(x)), . . . , sm(fm(x)), s.t. x ∈ X}.
We prove a similar result relating efficient and equitably efficient solutions of a
general MOP without imposing any conditions on the criteria functions. The result
will later be used to prove some other theorems in the chapter.
Theorem 5.4. If there exists an efficient solution x0 ∈ X such that f1(x
0) =
f2(x
0) = . . . = fm(x
0), then x0 is an equitably efficient solution of MCOP.
Proof. Let f1(x
0) = f2(x
0) = . . . = fm(x
0) = a. If x0 ∈ X is an efficient solution
of MCOP then
f(x0) = (f1(x
0), . . . , fm(x
0)) = (a, . . . , a) (5.34)
is a nondominated solution in the criteria space. Suppose x0 is not an equitably
efficient solution of MCOP, then by Theorem 3.1, x0 is not an efficient solution of
the multiple criteria problem
minimize { Θ¯(f(x)) s. t. x ∈ X},
where
Θ¯(f(x)) = (θ¯1(f(x)), . . . , θ¯m(f(x))),
θ¯i(f(x)) =
i∑
j=1
θ(f(x)), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m; x ∈ X,
θ1(f(x)) ≥ θ2(f(x)) ≥ . . . ≥ θm(f(x)) and
θi(f(x)) = fτ(i)(x) for some permutation τ of {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
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Hence, there exists some x ∈ X, x 6= x0 such that Θ¯(f(x)) dominates Θ¯(f(x0). If
Θ¯(f(x)) dominates Θ¯(f(x0)) then
θ¯i(f(x)) ≤ θ¯i(f(x
0)) ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and
θ¯j(f(x)) < θ¯j(f(x
0)) for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (5.35)
By Definition 3.16,
θ1(f(x)) ≥ . . . ≥ θm(f(x)),
where
θi(f(x)) = fτ(i)(x), for some permutation τ of the set {1, . . . ,m}.
fi(x
0) = a =⇒ θi(f(x
0)) = θi(a, a, . . . , a) = a, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m.
By Definition 3.17,
θ¯i(f(x
0)) =
i∑
j=1
θj(f(x
0))
= ia, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m. (5.36)
From (5.35) and (5.36) we get
θ¯i(f(x)) ≤ ia for all i = 1, . . . ,m and
θ¯j(f(x)) < ja for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (5.37)
In particular, for i = 1, inequality (5.37) gives
θ¯1(f(x)) = θ1(f(x)) ≤ a, (5.38)
but
θ1(f(x)) = max
i=1,...,m
f(x).
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Hence,
max
i=1,...,m
fi(x) ≤ a.
max
i=1,...,m
fi(x) ≤ a =⇒ fi(x) ≤ a for all i = 1, . . . ,m. (5.39)
By assumption of the theorem
fi(x
0) = a for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
so from inequality (5.39) we get
fi(x) ≤ fi(x
0) for all i = 1, . . . ,m. (5.40)
From inequality (5.35)
i∑
j=1
θj(f(x)) = θ¯i(f(x))
< θ¯i(f(x
0))
= ia for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
which is possible only if
fi(x) < fi(x
0) for at least one i in inequality 5.40. (5.41)
Combining inequalities 5.40 and 5.41, we get
fi(x) ≤ fi(x
0) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
fj(x) < fj(x
0) for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (5.42)
Inequality (5.42) implies that the point f(x) dominates f(x0), a contradiction.
Hence our assumption that x0 is not an equitably efficient solution can not be
true.
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Theorem 5.5. If x0 solves LCP then x0 is an equitably efficient solution of MOP
with fi(x
0) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. If x0 solves LCP, then
x0i ≥ 0, y
0
i ≥ 0 and (5.43)
y0i x
0
i = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n, where (5.44)
yi = Mix
0 + qi, Mi being the i
th row of the matrix M.
Inequalities (5.43) and (5.44) imply that x0 is a feasible solution of MOP with
criteria function values fi(x
0) = 0, for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
We show that x0 is an efficient solution of MOP.
Suppose x0 is not an efficient solution of MOP, then ∃ some x 6= x0 ∈ X such that
fi(x) ≤ fi(x
0) = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
fj(x) < fj(x
0) = 0 for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (5.45)
x ∈ X =⇒ xi ≥ 0, yi ≥ 0.
xi ≥ 0, yi ≥ 0 =⇒ fi(x) = yixi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n. (5.46)
Inequalities (5.45) and (5.46) can not hold simultaneously. Hence our assumption
that x0 is not efficient can not be true.
x0 is an efficient solution of MOP with fi(x) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n; hence by Theorem
5.1, x0 is an equitably efficient solution of MOP.
Theorem 5.6. If x0 is a feasible solution of MOP with fi(x
0) = 0,∀i = 1, . . . , n,
then x0 is an equitably efficient solution of MOP and solves LCP.
Proof. Let x0 ∈ X be such that fi(x
0) = y0i x
0
i = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Suppose x0 is not equitably efficient for MOP, then x0 is not an efficient solution of
the cumulatively ordered multiple criteria problem
minimize {θ¯1(f(x)), . . . , θ¯n(f(x)), s.t. x ∈ X}.
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Hence, there exists some x 6= x0 ∈ X such that
θ¯i(f(x)) ≤ θ¯i(f(x
0)) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and (5.47)
θ¯j(f(x)) < θ¯j(f(x
0)) for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (5.48)
fi(x
0) = 0 =⇒ θi(f(x
0)) = 0∀ i = 1, . . . , n
=⇒ θ¯i(f(x
0)) = 0∀ i = 1, . . . , n. (5.49)
Substituting the above values of θ¯i(f(x
0)) from inequality (5.49) in inequalities
(5.47) and (5.48), we get
θ¯i(f(x)) ≤ 0∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
θ¯j(f(x)) < 0 for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (5.50)
x ∈ X =⇒ xi ≥ 0, yi ≥ 0,
xi ≥ 0, yi ≥ 0 =⇒ fi(x) = yixi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
fi(x) ≥ 0 =⇒ θi(f(x)) ≥ 0 =⇒ θ¯i(f(x)) ≥ 0∀i = 1, . . . , n. (5.51)
Inequalities (5.50) and (5.51) can not hold simultaneously. Hence, x0 is an efficient
solution of the cumulatively ordered multiple criteria problem, which by Theorem
3.1 is an equitably efficient solution of the MOP.
Alternatively, using the definition of efficient solutions, it can be easily ver-
ified that any x0 ∈ X for which f(x0) = 0, is efficient.
This, coupled with the fact that all the criteria values are equal, namely 0, proves
that x0 is an equitably efficient solution of MOP.
Since x ∈ X, xi ≥ 0, yi ≥ 0, yixi = 0, where yi = Mix+ qi,∀i = 1, . . . , n, x
0 solves
the LCP.
Remark 5.2. From Theorems 5.5 and 5.6 it is clear that any feasible solution of
MOP at which all the objective values attain the value zero, is equitably efficient.
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Corollary 5.1. x0 ∈ X is an equitably efficient solution with fi(x
0) = 0, ∀ i =
1, . . . , n, if and only if x0 solves LCP.
Proof. The proof follows from Theorems 5.5, 5.6 and Remark 5.2.
Remark 5.3. In general, the set of equitably efficient solutions of a MOP is a
proper subset of the set of equitably efficient solutions of the MOP. This follows
from the fact that equitably efficient solutions are obtained by imposing additional
conditions on the Pareto preference that identifies efficient solutions. For the MOP
related to the LCP, the set of equitably efficient solutions, if there exists one, is the
same as the set of efficient solutions.
Corollary 5.2. If LCP(q,M) has a solution, then the set of efficient solutions of
MOP and the set of equitably efficient solutions of MOP are non-empty and identical.
If x is in either of these sets, then fi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 5.5 and Remark 5.3.
The following two chapters demonstrate equitably efficient solutions by ap-
plying the concept to problems as diverse as linear regression analysis and asset
allocation.
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CHAPTER 6
EQUITABLE EFFICIENCY AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The problem of parameter estimation in regression analysis is well known
and widely studied. Regression analysis models the relationship between a response
or the dependent variable, usually named y and one or more predictor or the inde-
pendent variables, usually named x’s. Linear regression assumes the best estimate
of the response variable as a linear function of some unknown parameters, the re-
gression parameters, while in nonlinear models, relationship between variables to
be analyzed is nonlinear in the parameters. Deviation between the observed or the
actual value of the response variable and the value obtained from the regression
function is called the error. The goal of regression analysis is to choose the regres-
sion parameters so as to minimize some function of these errors. Depending on
the data under study, various error functions are used to model the problem, the
ones commonly used being the least squares regression function, regression function
formed by taking the maximum of the absolute deviations and the one formed by
summing the absolute deviations. When relationship between the variables can not
be adequately described by linear models, nonlinear models are applied to the data.
In this chapter we study some regression models as multiple criteria opti-
mization models. Since regression is concerned with minimization of some function
of the errors, there seems no reason to treat these errors in any way but equitable.
We start by defining the problem as is done in statistical literature, provide an al-
ternative equitable multiple criteria optimization formulation and apply methods of
multiple criteria optimization to obtain various equitably nondominated errors in
the criteria space and correspondingly, equitably efficient solutions in the parameter
space. We further notice how the regression parameters of the ordinary statistical
model can be identified as an equitably efficient solution of the related multi criteria
optimization problem in a limiting sense.
Statistical models start with certain assumptions on the distribution of the underly-
ing data. Irrespective of the statistical distribution of the errors, our multi-criteria
model can be used to obtain the parameters resulting in equitable errors.
6.1 Linear Regression Problem
Regression analysis is concerned with the problem of predicting the values of
a variable, called the dependent or the response variable, on the basis of information
provided by other variables, called the independent, predictor or regression variables.
Let Y , an n × 1 vector, denote the values of the response variable corre-
sponding to X, an n× k matrix of the values of the regressor variables. Then
(RM) : Y = β0η + Xβ + ǫ
is the multiple linear regression model, where β0, a scalar, β, a k × 1 vector of
unknown parameters, are the regression parameters, η is a n× 1 vector of ones and
ǫ is a n×1 vector of unobservable random errors. The objective of regression analysis
is to estimate the regression parameters in a way so as to minimize the deviations
between the actual values of Y from those obtained by the regression model. This
’closeness’ between the two Y values is expressed in terms of Lp-norms, resulting in
minimization problems of the form
minimize (
n∑
i=1
|ei|
p)
1
p , p ≥ 1
where ei = yi − (b0 + xi · b), i = 1, . . . , n.
yi, then denotes an estimate of the i
th element of the vector Y . xi is the i
th row of
the matrix X, b0 is a scalar and b is a k × 1 vector. b0 and b1 give estimates of β0
and β respectively.
The three most common approaches of estimating β correspond to the cases where
p = 1, 2 and p =∞.
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p = 1 represents the L1-norm estimation problem, commonly referred as MSAE,
minimizing sum of absolute errors,
(MSAE) : minimize
n∑
i=1
|ei|.
For p =∞, the L∞-norm estimation problem, known as MMAE, minimizing max-
imum of absolute errors, is defined as
(MMAE) : minimize max
i=1,...n
|ei|.
The optimization commonly used in regression analysis corresponds to the case when
p = 2, called the L2-norm estimation problem. This problem is more frequently
referred as MSSE, minimizing sum of squared errors or the least squares regression
problem,
(MSSE) : minimize (
n∑
i=1
(|ei|)
2)
1
2 .
6.2 Multi-criteria Formulation of the
Linear Regression Problem
The MSSE criterion of parameter estimation results in the best linear un-
biased estimator of the parameters, Arthanari and Dodge (1981). The criterion
is optimal and results in the maximum likelihood estimates only if the errors are
independent and follow a normal distribution with mean zero and common vari-
ance σ2, but for non-gaussian distributions, the estimators might be far away from
optimal(Andrews, 1974). In(Hogg, 1974), the author demonstrates that the effect
of outliers that occur at the extreme values of the predictor variables can be very
disruptive. Similar limitations apply for the MSAE estimators too. MSAE estima-
tion procedure is preferred to the MSSE when errors follow contaminated normal
distribution(Ekblom, 1974).
The problem of estimating the regression parameters of regression models of
the form (RM) via multiple criteria formulations have been studied earlier by some
authors. In(Narula and Wellington, 1980, 2002), the authors formulate the multiple
regression problem as a multiple criteria problem by considering MSSE, MAAE and
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MSAE as three different criteria. They argue that under certain circumstances,
choice of a single criterion might not be appropriate for estimating the parameters
and propose alternative ways of using combinations of these three different criteria,
rather than a single one, to estimate the parameters. In(Narula and Straubel,
1992), the authors propose similar procedure for parameter estimation in nonlinear
regression models.
Its noteworthy that the aforesaid criteria are incommensurate in the sense that
they are different in nature and hence can not be directly compared, but for any of
the given MSSE, MSAE or the MMAE measures, all the errors for any particular
measure are commensurate as they represent outcomes that have the same physical
interpretation and units.
Let
ei = yi − (b0 + xi · b), i = 1, . . . , n,
where (b0, b) is the vector estimating the vector (β0, β) of parameters and ei denotes
the error associated with the i− th observation.
Let
ρ : R −→ R,
denote the criterion function associated with the error. The multi-criteria regression
model associated with the linear regression problem, then, is defined as the problem
(MCRP ) : minimize {ρ(e1), . . . , ρ(en)}.
If
ρ(e) = e2,
we have the multi-criteria alternative of the linear L2-norm estimation problem,
given by,
(MCLSQ) : minimize {e21, . . . , e
2
n}
and if
ρ(e) = |e| ,
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the multi-criteria model corresponding to the linear L1-norm estimation is given by
(MCAE) : minimize {|e1|, . . . , |en|}.
Note that the (MMAE) model of linear regression can be obtained by applying
minimax optimization to the (MCAE) model.
In the next section we apply the (MCLSQ) model to estimate the regression
parameters from an equitable point of view. We also see that the solution to the
(MSSE) model can be obtained as an equitably efficient solution of the related
multi-criteria problems for a particular limiting sequence of weights. The method is
applicable to other regression models too.
6.3 Equitably Efficient Solutions of the
Multiple Criteria Regression Model
In most cases, choice of a specific regression model to fit a data set depends
on the problem under study. For example, ordinary least squares is unsuitable for a
data where the errors are not normally distributed. even for data where the errors
are normally distributed, the least squares estimation is more sensitive to outliers
and are often removed from the data before applying the principles of least squares
estimation. In certain cases, for example, in biological data sets, it might not be
wise to remove the outliers as they might be the ones being more responsible for a
meaningful interpretation of the model. Equitable models can be considered as an
alternative way to to study such problems, where it is desirable to retain the outliers
and treat the errors uniformly. As the goal of the modeling is to produce equitable
solutions, no assumption is superposed on the underlying data set.
6.3.1 Equitable solutions of the MCLSQ model
Consider the MCLSQ problem defined earlier,
(MCLSQ) : minimize {e21, . . . , e
2
n} ,
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where, ei = yi − (b0 + xi.b). Let f = {e
2
1, . . . , e
2
n}.
Let
θ1(f) ≥ θ2(f) ≥ . . . θn(f)
denote the nonincreasing ordering of the components of f and
θ¯i(f) =
i∑
j=1
θj(f), i = 1, . . . , n.
From Corollary 3.1, finding equitably efficient solutions of MCLSQ is equivalent to
finding efficient solutions of the problem
(OWAMCLSQ) : minimize {θ¯1(f), . . . , θ¯n(f)}.
Ordering the functions in OWAMCLSQ makes it difficult to make the problem
implementable, but the above problem can be reduced to an equivalent problem,
Kostreva et al. (2004),
minimize {z1, . . . , zn}
subject to zk = ktk +
n∑
i=1
dik, k = 1, . . . , n (6.1)
tk + dik ≥ e
2
i , i, k = 1, . . . , n.
We apply the weighted method to the convert the above problem to
minimize
n∑
i=1
wizi
subject to zk = ktk +
m∑
i=1
dik, k = 1, . . . , n,
tk + dik ≥ e
2
i , i, k = 1, . . . , n,
dik ≥ 0 for all i, k = 1, . . . , n,
where, w = (w1, . . . , wn), wi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n is a given weighting vector.
Solving the above problem by varying the weights results in various efficient solutions
of OWAMCLSQ, which, in turn are equitably efficient solutions of MCLSQ.
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In particular, for 0 < ǫ < 1, consider the weighting vectors w ∈ Rn given by
w = (ǫ, . . . , ǫ, 1− ǫ).
0 < ǫi < 1 =⇒ wi > 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Every optimal solution of the weighted problem
minimize { w1θ¯1(f) + w2θ¯2(f) + . . .+ wnθ¯n(f)},
is an efficient solution of OWAMCLSQ, which, by Corollary 3.1, is an equitably
efficient solution of MCLSQ.
As a limiting case, the weighting vector given by
w = lim
ǫ→0
(ǫ, . . . , 1− ǫ)
generates an equitably efficient solution of MCLSQ. Note that such a weighting
vector tends to minimize the function
θ¯n(f) =
n∑
j=1
θj(f)
= e21 + . . . e
2
n,
which is the objective function of the ordinary least squares problem.
By making ǫ sufficiently close to zero, one is able to generate solutions that are not
only equitably efficient but stay close enough to the solution of the ordinary least
squares problem. Hence, in addition to obtaining various equitably efficient solutions
to the multi-criteria model, the solution of the ordinary least squares problem can
be viewed as an equitably efficient solution for a particular limiting sequence of
weights.
In the following section, we obtain equitable estimators of a numerical prob-
lem.
6.3.2 Example
Consider the data set in table 6.1(Arthanari and Dodge, 1981).
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Table 6.1 Example Data
Observation Number(i) yi xi
1 2 5
2 5 4
3 4 6
4 8 9
5 3 7
The linear least squares estimators for this data set are obtained as the
optimal solution of the problem
minimize {
5∑
i=1
(yi − (b0 + b1xi))
2, s.t. (b0, b1) ∈ R
2}.
Table 6.2 gives the least squares estimators of the data along along with the squared
errors and the sum of squared errors.
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Table 6.2 Least Squared Estimators and Corresponding Errors
Estimators(bi) Squared Errors(e
2
i ) Sum of Squared Errors
b0 b1 e
2
1 e
2
2 e
2
3 e
2
4 e
2
5
∑5
i=1 ei
2
-0.0416 0.7162 2.3733 4.7336 0.0659 2.5427 3.8926 13.6081
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We obtain some some equitably efficient parameters of the MCLSQ model
ensuring that the errors are equitably nondominated in the criteria space.
Equitably efficient solutions of MCLSQ problem are obtained as equitably efficient
solutions of the problem
minimize {(y1 − (b0 + b1x1))
2, . . . , (y5 − (b0 + b1x5))
2, s.t. (b0, b1) ∈ R
2},
which, by (6.1), can be obtained by finding the efficient solutions of the problem
minimize {z1, . . . , z5}
subject to zk = ktk +
5∑
i=1
dik, k = 1, . . . , 5, (6.2)
tk + dik ≥ (yi − (b0 − b1xi)
2, i, k = 1, . . . , 5,
(b0, b1) ∈ R
2.
Efficient solutions of (6.2) can be obtained as optimal solutions of the single-objective
weighted problem
minimize
5∑
i=1
wkzk
subject to zk = ktk +
5∑
i=1
dik, k = 1, . . . , 5,
tk + dik ≥ (yi − (b0 + b1xi))
2, i, k = 1, . . . , 5,
dik ≥0 for all i, k = 1, . . . , 5,
for given weighting vectors (w1, . . . , w5), where wi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , 5.
Table 6.3 presents some of the equitably efficient solutions for certain vector
of weights while Table 6.4 presents the equitably efficient solutions along with the
individual squared errors as well as the sum of squared errors.
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Table 6.3 Equitable Estimators and Corresponding Weights
Weights(wi) Equitable Estimators(bi)
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 b0 b1
0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.9600 0.0241 0.7072
0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.4600 0.5100 0.0624 0.7054
0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.9100 0.0600 0.1111 0.7017
0.0100 0.0100 0.4600 0.0100 0.5100 0.6829 0.6167
0.0100 0.0100 0.4600 0.4600 0.0600 0.7635 0.6052
0.0100 0.0100 0.9100 0.0100 0.0600 0.8000 0.6000
0.0100 0.4600 0.0100 0.0100 0.5100 0.7000 0.6000
0.0100 0.4600 0.0100 0.4600 0.0600 0.7277 0.6000
0.0100 0.4600 0.4600 0.0100 0.0600 0.8000 0.6000
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Table 6.4 Equitable Estimators with Errors and Squared Errors
Equitable Squared Sum of
Estimators(bi) Errors(e
2
i ) Squared Errors
b0 b1 e
2
1 e
2
2 e
2
3 e
2
4 e
2
5
∑5
i=1 e
2
i
0.0241 0.7072 2.4346 4.6093 0.0716 2.5943 3.8999 13.6097
0.0624 0.7054 2.5257 4.4780 0.0868 2.5257 4.0000 13.6162
0.1111 0.7017 2.6226 4.3356 0.1031 2.4771 4.0917 13.6301
0.6829 0.6167 3.1207 3.4232 0.1469 3.1207 4.0000 13.8114
0.7635 0.6052 3.2026 3.2965 0.1559 3.2026 4.0000 13.8576
0.8000 0.6000 3.2400 3.2400 0.1600 3.2400 4.0000 13.8800
0.7000 0.6000 2.8900 3.6100 0.0900 3.6100 3.6100 13.8100
0.7277 0.6000 2.9851 3.5054 0.1074 3.5054 3.7162 13.8194
0.8000 0.6000 3.2400 3.2400 0.1600 3.2400 4.0000 13.8800
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From Table 6.4, we find that the first three solutions have sum of squared
errors very close to that obtained for the ordinary least squares regression of Table
6.2. Comparing the range of the individual errors, we see that these equitable
solutions are lesser dispersed than the ordinary least squares solution. For the
remaining solutions, the sum of squared errors are relatively higher but the solutions
are much less dispersed, thereby, reducing inequity. Equity of these solutions can
be considered to compensate for the increase in the sum of squares values.
Table 6.5 presents some equitably efficient solutions for limiting sequence
of weights and Table 6.6 presents the equitably efficient solutions with individual
squared errors and sum of squared errors corresponding to these weights.
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Table 6.5 Equitable Estimators and Corresponding Weights
Weights(wi) Equitable Estimators(bi)
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 b0 b1
0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.99999 -0.0405 0.7162
0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.99998 -0.0404 0.7162
0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.99997 -0.0403 0.7163
0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 0.99996 -0.0402 0.7162
0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.99995 -0.0401 0.7162
0.00006 0.00006 0.00006 0.00006 0.99994 -0.0400 0.7162
0.00007 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007 0.99993 -0.0399 0.7162
0.00008 0.00008 0.00008 0.00008 0.99992 -0.0399 0.7162
0.00009 0.00009 0.00009 0.00009 0.99991 -0.0398 0.7161
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Table 6.6 Equitable Estimators with errors and Squared Errors
Equitable Estimators(bi) Squared Errors(e
2
i ) Sum of Squared Errors
b0 b1 e
2
1 e
2
2 e
2
3 e
2
4 e
2
5
∑5
i=1 e
2
i
-0.0405 0.7162 2.3734 4.7334 0.0659 2.5427 3.8927 13.6081
-0.0404 0.7162 2.3735 4.7332 0.0660 2.5427 3.8928 13.6081
-0.0403 0.7163 2.3736 4.7329 0.0660 2.5426 3.8929 13.6081
-0.0402 0.7162 2.3738 4.7327 0.0660 2.5426 3.8931 13.6081
-0.0401 0.7162 2.3739 4.7324 0.0660 2.5425 3.8932 13.6081
-0.0400 0.7162 2.3741 4.7322 0.0660 2.5424 3.8934 13.6081
-0.0400 0.7162 2.3743 4.7319 0.0661 2.5423 3.8935 13.6081
-0.0399 0.7162 2.3745 4.7316 0.0661 2.5423 3.8937 13.6081
-0.0398 0.7161 2.3747 4.7313 0.0661 2.5422 3.8939 13.6081
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From Table 6.6, except for round-off errors, the range of dispersion of equi-
table errors for any solution are almost similar to the dispersion range of the solution
obtained using the ordinary least squares procedure. The sum of squared errors for
these solutions are very close to the least squares solution. This seems to justify
the applicability of the equitably efficient concept to the least squares regression
problem which demands equity in treatment of individual errors.
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CHAPTER 7
EQUITABLE ASSET ALLOCATION FOR
SINGLE PERIOD INVESTMENT
Portfolio allocation is concerned with investing an initial outlay of capital
into a number of assets whose returns are uncertain. In single period allocation,
money is invested at the initial time and payoff is attained at the end of the time-
period. Uncertainty associated with the returns make the investment risky and the
investor is faced with the task of investing judiciously so as to maximize his expected
portfolio return with minimum risk involved. Portfolio problem, thus, is a bicriteria
problem consisting of two criteria, expected return and risk of returns, the former
being maximized and the latter being minimized.
Different risk measures associated with the returns are studied in portfolio literature,
variance of returns being the most commonly used. Markowitz (1952) formulated
the portfolio selection problem as a parametric quadratic programming problem
in which the variance of the returns is minimized subject to the constraint that
the required expected return is warranted(Teo and Yang, 2001). Diversifying by
investing suitable amounts in different financial instruments tends to reduce the
overall risk of the portfolio.
Asset allocation is the term given to portfolio allocation where that the
financial instruments under consideration are divided into different asset classes.
For example, if we are looking for an investment strategy to invest in stocks, bonds
and futures on commodities, it is better to have two asset classes, one composed of
stocks and bonds and the other composed of the futures. The underlying principle is
based on the correlation between assets in different classes. Futures on commodities
tend to be negatively correlated to stocks and bonds and dividing the classes on
basis of the correlation tends to reduce the risk.
In this chapter we look at the problem of asset allocation by dividing the
assets under suitable classes. The asset returns being random and each state of
nature being equally probable, it seems justified to treat each class, or more specif-
ically, the return from each, uniformly. In this way we create an objective function
for each class which corresponds to the expected return from that class and look for
equitably efficient solutions of this multiple objective problem. This ensures lesser
dispersion of returns relative to each other than that one would expect by maximiz-
ing the expected return from all the classes grouped together. This might provide
added protection in the case the most favored stock goes down drastically.
Our formulation differs from the traditional approach too in the sense that the ex-
pected returns from each class solely form the objective functions of the problem
while keeping the variance of the assets completely outside the objectives domain.
This ensures that we are not comparing two entities that have totally different units
and thus avoids the need of any scaling.
7.1 Multiple Criteria Asset Allocation Problem
Consider the set J = {S1, . . . , Sn} consisting of n assets. Let
J = ∪mi=1Ji, where Ji ⊂ J and Ji ∩ Jj = φ for i 6= j
denote the m asset classes in which the n assets are divided. Without loss of
generality, let
J1 = {S1, . . . , Sk1}
J2 = {Sk1+1, . . . , Sk1+1+k2}, ....
Jm = {Skm−1+1, . . . , Skm−1+1+km}, km = n.
Let R = (ri)
n
i=1 be the row vector denoting the random rate of return of stock i,
X = (xi)
n
i=1 be the row vector of the fraction of money invested in asset i. Further,
let E(ri) = r¯i represent the expected return from asset i. Expected return from the
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m asset classes, then, are given by
E(R1) = E(r1x1 + . . . ,+rk1xk1)
= E(r1)x1 + . . . ,+E(rk1)xk1
= r¯1x1 + . . . ,+r¯k1xk1 , . . . ,
E(Rm) = E(rkm−1+1xkm−1+1 + . . .+ rkm−1+1+kmxkm−1+1+km)
= E(rkm−1+1)xkm−1+1 + . . .+ E(rkm−1+1+km)xkm−1+1+km
= r¯km−1+1xkm−1+1 + . . .+ r¯km−1+1+kmxkm−1+1+km .
If A denotes the n × n matrix representing the covariance between the returns
from the n assets, then our problem is to maximize the expected returns of each
class subject to bounds on the covariance of the asset classes. Mathematically, the
multiple-criteria asset allocation is defined as
(MCAAP ) : maximize{E(R1), . . . , E(Rm)}
subject to Cmin ≤ XAX
t ≤ Cmax
∑n
i=1 xi = 1
xi ≥ 0,
where Cmin and Cmax represent reasonable lower and upper bounds on the risk of
investment.
Our goal is to find equitably efficient allocations.
7.2 Two-phase Solution Procedure
Solution of MCAAP depends on the risk level, which, in turn, depends on
the covariance matrix A. Choosing the risk level arbitrarily might make the problem
infeasible. Reasonable values of Cmin and Cmax can be obtained by finding bounds
on the portfolio variance.
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In phase 1, we solve the following single objective optimization problems:
(SOPI) : maximize XAXt
subject to
n∑
i=1
E(Ri) = z
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n
and
(SOPII) : minimize XAXt
subject to
n∑
i=1
E(Ri) = z
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
where z is a variable.
Let Cmax be the optimal objective value of SOPI and Cmin be the optimal objective
value of SOPII.
In phase 2 we can use corollary (4.1) or results from sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 to find
some equitably efficient asset allocations of MCAAP by setting the risk level bounds
Cmin and Cmax obtained from phase 1. Depending on the method used, phase 2
results in one or several equitably efficient solutions. For instance, if corollary (4.1)
is used and minimax problem has a unique solution, then we get one equitably
efficient solution. Equitably efficient allocations tend to reduce risk by selecting
portfolios with returns less dispersed relative to each other. In the next section we
present a numerical example and compare the solutions obtained using the equitable
approach to that obtained using the traditional multiple-criteria approach.
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7.3 Example
Consider the data in Table 7.1 that gives the monthly returns and standard
deviations of commodity futures and bonds from July 1959 to December 2004(Gor-
ton and Rouwenhorst, 2005). The calculated variances are also shown. The corre-
Table 7.1 Example Data
Commodity Futures Bonds
Average Return(r¯) 0.89 0.64
Standard Deviation(σ) 3.47 2.45
Variance(σ2) 12.0409 6.0025
lation between bonds and commodities futures during that period was -0.14. The
correlation being negative, its better to take the two instruments as two different
asset classes.
The correlation between to random variables X and Y is given by
ρ(X,Y ) =
cov(X,Y )
σXσY
.
The covariance between commodities futures and bonds is
cov = −0.14 ∗ 3.47 ∗ 2.45 = −1.1902.
The covariance matrix for returns of futures and bonds is given in Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2 Covariance Matrix
Commodities Futures Bonds
Commodities Futures 12.0409 -1.1902
Bonds -1.1902 6.0025
From Tables 7.1 and 7.2 we see that the maximum return on commodities
futures is about 40% higher than that on the bonds but the associated risk is almost
double. The comparitive higher return comes with a relatively higher risk. The two
assets are negatively correlated too. A conservative investor would like to maximize
his return without taking too much risk. Under such circumstances it seems more
reasonable to look for allocations where the difference between the weights assigned
to the two assets is not too huge. Hence, we look for allocations that are efficient as
well as equitable. Equitably efficient allocations of the two asset allocation problem
are obtained by finding equitably efficient solutions of the problem
(BCAAP ) : maximize{r¯1x1, r¯2x2}
subject to Cmin ≤ XAX
t ≤ Cmax
x1 + x2 = 1
x1, x2 ≥ 0,
where r¯1 = 0.89 and r¯2 = 0.64 represent the expected returns on futures commodities
and bonds respectively.
Phase 1 optimal solutions of the single objective problems associated with BCAAP
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are obtained by solving the problems
maximize XAXt
subject to r¯1x1 + r¯2x2 = z
x1 + x2 = 1 (7.1)
x1, x2 ≥ 0
and
minimize XAXt
subject to r¯1x1 + r¯2x2 = z
x1 + x2 = 1 (7.2)
x1, x2 ≥ 0
where x1 and x2 are the fractions invested in commodities futures and bonds re-
spectively.
Optimal solutions of (7.1) and (7.2) along with the objective values are
(x1, x2, z,XAX
t) = (1.0000, 0.0000, 0.8900, 12.0409)
(x1, x2, z,XAX
t) = (0.3522, 0.6478, 0.7280, 3.4694).
In phase 2, we solve BCAAP by setting Cmin = 3.47 and Cmax = 12.04. The two-
phase minimax method from Corollary 4.1 yields the equitably efficient asset given
in Table 7.3.
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Table 7.3 Equitable Assets using 2-phase Minimax
Futures Bonds Futures Return Bonds Return Variance
x1 x2 E(R1) E(R2) XAX
′
0.3522 0.6478 0.3134 0.4146 3.4694
Several equitably efficient solutions of BCAAP can be obtained by applying
equitable scalarizations from section 4.2 or applying the weighted method to the
ordered weighted averaging formulation
maximize {θ¯1(r¯1x1, r¯2x2), θ¯2(r¯1x1, r¯2x2)}
subject to Cmin ≤ XAX
t ≤ Cmax
x1 + x2 = 1 (7.3)
x1, x2 ≥ 0.
Since
θ¯1(r¯1x1, r¯2x2) = maximum {r¯1x1, r¯2x2}
and
θ¯2(r¯1x1, r¯2x2) = r¯1x1 + r¯2x2,
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formulation (7.3) is equivalent to
maximize {y, r¯2x2 + r¯2x2}
subject to Cmin ≤ XAX
t ≤ Cmax
r¯1x1 ≤ y (7.4)
r¯2x2 ≤ y
x1 + x2 = 1
x1, x2 ≥ 0.
Table 7.4 presents some of the equitably efficient allocations of BCAAP
obtained by applying the weighting method to formulation (7.4). Table 7.5 presents
efficient allocations of BCAAP.
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Table 7.4 Equitably Efficient Assets
Futures Bonds Futures Bonds Net Absolute Variance
Return Return Return Difference
x1 x2 E(R1) E(R2) E(R1)+E(R2) |E(R1)-E(R2)| XAX
′
0.4264 0.5736 0.3795 0.3671 0.7466 0.0124 3.5819
0.3487 0.6513 0.3103 0.4169 0.7272 0.1065 3.4697
0.3389 0.6611 0.3017 0.4231 0.7247 0.1214 3.4730
0.3271 0.6729 0.2911 0.4307 0.7218 0.1395 3.4823
0.4152 0.5848 0.3695 0.3743 0.7438 0.0048 3.5505
0.3406 0.6594 0.3031 0.4220 0.7251 0.1189 3.4722
0.3813 0.6187 0.3394 0.3960 0.7353 0.0566 3.4868
0.3408 0.6592 0.3033 0.4219 0.7252 0.1185 3.4721
0.3520 0.6480 0.3133 0.4147 0.7280 0.1014 3.4694
0.3599 0.6401 0.3203 0.4097 0.7300 0.0894 3.4706
0.3830 0.6170 0.3409 0.3949 0.7358 0.0540 3.4889
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Table 7.5 Efficient Assets
Futures Bonds Futures Bonds Net Absolute Variance
Return Return Return Difference
x1 x2 E(R1) E(R2) E(R1)+E(R2) |E(R1)-E(R2)| XAX
′
0.5596 0.4404 0.4981 0.2818 0.7799 0.2162 4.3485
0.3742 0.6258 0.3330 0.4005 0.7335 0.0675 3.4793
0.2470 0.7530 0.2198 0.4819 0.7017 0.2621 3.6954
0.2510 0.7490 0.2233 0.4794 0.7027 0.2560 3.6787
0.3589 0.6411 0.3194 0.4103 0.7297 0.0909 3.4703
0.3849 0.6151 0.3425 0.3937 0.7362 0.0511 3.4913
0.2882 0.7118 0.2565 0.4555 0.7121 0.1990 3.5529
0.3042 0.6958 0.2707 0.4453 0.7160 0.1746 3.5165
0.6208 0.3792 0.5525 0.2427 0.7952 0.3098 4.9432
0.6281 0.3719 0.5590 0.2380 0.7970 0.3210 5.0242
0.4273 0.5727 0.3803 0.3665 0.7468 0.0138 3.5848
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From Table 7.4 we find that the maximum absolute difference of returns
for the equitably efficient allocations is 0.1395 corresponding to allocation 4 and the
minimum is 0.0045 corresponding to asset 5. The net returns corresponding to these
allocations are 0.7218 with a variance of 3.4283 and 0.7438 with a variance of 3.5505,
respectively. The dispersion of the components of the outcome vectors(individual
returns) lie between 0.0048 and 0.1315. The variances for all the allocations are
reasonably low and are much lower than the individual variances of the two assets.
Equitable assets, thus, provide better hedge against investment risk by eliminating
allocations with disproportionate returns. Even if one class under performs, we can
expect a some what ’balanced’ return from the other.
From Table 7.5 we see that most of the allocations are widely dispersed in
their returns, compared to the equitably efficient allocations. The allocations with
low dispersion have returns and variances similar to the equitable ones. For the
assets with wide dispersions, the higher returns are out weighed by the relatively
higher variances. such allocations, despite their higher returns, provide reduced
hedge against risk in case the class with higher return under performs.
In Table 7.6 we present efficient portfolios for the same data from Table
7.2 without dividing the assets into classes. We apply the classical mean-variance
portfolio approach to obtain the solutions. Its evident from the Table that except for
the last portfolio, returns and variances for the remaining ones are similar and close
to those obtained by asset-class division approach of Table 7.4. In fact, the equitable
approach eliminates the last portfolio which has a some what higher return at the
expense of reasonably higher variance. Hence finding equitably efficient allocations
after carefully dividing into suitable classes seems to reduce the investment risk by
assigning allocations with equitable returns.
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 present comparative plots of the equitably efficient assets
and efficient assets respectively of our 2-class asset allocation problem. Figure 7.3
is a plot of efficient portfolios without using the class approach and applying the
classical mean-variance approach of Markovitz.
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Table 7.6 Efficient Mean-Variance Portfolio
Portfolio Return Variance
E(R) XAX
′
0.7280 3.4694
0.7282 3.4694
0.7284 3.4695
0.7287 3.4696
0.7291 3.4698
0.7296 3.4702
0.7303 3.4712
0.7316 3.4736
0.7342 3.4817
0.7418 3.5314
0.8900 12.0409
Figure 7.1 Equitably Efficient Assets in the Criteria Space
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Figure 7.2 Efficient Assets in the Criteria Space
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Figure 7.3 Mean-Variance Efficient Portfolio in the Criteria Space
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Next chapter is the last chapter of our present research in which we conclude
our work with some suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The objective of our work is to study the theory and methodology of equi-
table efficiency in multiple-criteria optimization, stress its importance and demon-
strate its relevance by means of applications. In the present chapter, we summarize
the findings pertaining to our goal and present some directions for future research.
The first two chapters presented a brief introduction and literature review
on equitable efficiency in multiple criteria optimization. After introducing the no-
tations and terminology required in our work, we developed some characterizations
of equitably efficient solutions. Ordering of objective functions is hard to imple-
ment in practice. Toward a theoretical foundation of equitable efficiency, we came
up with additional ways of generating such solutions by building equitable aggrega-
tions based on strictly-Schur-convex functions. The single-objective optimizations
problems resulting from these aggregations being independent of the ordering of the
objective functions remove the onus of ordering of objective functions, and thus,
focus on ways of generating equitable solutions by working with the objective func-
tions directly. Furthermore, our methods do not assume any special structure on the
optimization problem and are able to generate several equitably efficient solutions
by varying the parameter.
The minimax procedure is widely discussed in many areas of optimization including
multiple-criteria optimization. We proved that the two-phase minimax method can
be used to find equitably efficient solutions. We addressed a question related to the
existence of equitably efficient solutions for linear MCOPs.
In the next part of our work, we demonstrated the relevance of equitable
efficiency by showing its relation to matrix games and linear complementarity prob-
lems. We showed how zero-efficient solutions, as defined by some authors in an
earlier work, are the same as equitably efficient solutions with specific objective val-
ues. Because equitable dominance is a refinement of Pareto dominance, the set of
equitably efficient solutions is, in general, a subset of the efficient solutions. Chap-
ter 5 demonstrated the equivalence of equitably efficient and efficient solutions for
a MCOP related to a particular class of linear complementarity problems.
In Chapters 6 and 7 we presented the problems of regression analysis and
asset allocation where the application of equitable efficiency might be relevant. In
the past, regression problems were studied as a multi-criteria optimization problem
but none of the previous papers in the area addressed the issue of equitable treatment
of regression errors. We considered all the errors to be uniform, which seemed
justified too, and thus obtained solutions in which all the errors are treated in an
equitable manner. In our view, the equitable asset allocations from Chapter 7 can
be justified from a risk-averse investor’s view point. A risk averse investor may
prefer almost similar returns from two different asset classes than bearing the risk
of losing too much in case the preferred asset class performs unexpectedly.
Future work
The issue of equitable efficiency in multiple-criteria optimization is not much
explored in the literature. We have developed some theory related to finding equi-
tably efficient solutions by means of equitable aggregations. There is much potential
for future work on finding ways to generate equitably efficient solutions using existing
scalarizations of finding efficient solutions. The applicability of such scalarizations,
for example, the epsilon-constraint scalarization(Chankong and Haimes, 1983), ap-
plied to the ordered weighted problem, is one area of concern.
Equitably efficient solutions are contained within the set of efficient solutions. An-
other direction of research is a two-phase method in which efficient solutions from
phase 1 are used to find equitably efficient solutions in phase 2.
We demonstrated the applicability of equitable efficiency to two different
problems. Another problem of interest is from stratified sampling. Optimization
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models have been applied to such problems in the past. (Mulvey, 1983), demon-
strates that such problems are special cases of facility location problems. Loca-
tion problems are well studied in terms of equitable efficiency(Ogryczak, 2000).
Analysing the sampling results on the basis of equity deserves attention.
As another area of application, we would like to apply equity models to
problems of machine utilization in multi period production systems. For each period
we are interested in maximizing the fraction of time the machine is utilized(not idle).
For such systems we would like to have solutions that do not result in too disparate
utilization from period to period.
There may be many more questions coming up as the work progresses in the
future.
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